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When Agony Begets Zealotry

The Differential Role of Globalization Threats in Mediating the Effect of Competitive Victimhood on Muslims' Religious Fundamentalism

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Summary

The current investigations examine how globalization signifying either identity threat or realistic threat has a differential role in mediating the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims' religious fundamentalism. Study 1 ($N = 119$) revealed that identity globalization threat and not realistic globalization threat significantly mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims' religious fundamentalism. Study 2

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1 ($N = 155$) successfully replicated the finding in Study 1. Moreover, Study 2 also revealed that such mediating role of identity globalization threat was stronger among participants perceiving Muslims as having high than low group entitativity, which refers to the extent to which Muslims as a group are considered to be a one, homogenous collective rather than an aggregation of individuals. Theoretical implications for understanding situational or social factors of Muslims' religious fundamentalism are discussed, as are strategies to reduce competitive victimhood among members of this religious group.

Keywords

competitive victimhood – Muslims' religious fundamentalism – identity globalization threat – realistic globalization threat – entitativity

Introduction

Negative attitudes against Muslims and Islam in the Western societies reported by a variety of empirical studies have gained popularity, more particularly in the aftermath of terror attacks of the September 11 (EUMC, 2005; EUMC, 2006; González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Kunst, Sam, & Ulleberg, 2013; Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006; Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2007; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). These attitudes are captured in the term "Islamophobia," which refers to the perception that the existence of Muslims in the West poses multifarious threats to host countries such as insecurity and cultural incompatibility (Cesari, 2011; Dunn, Klocker, & Salabay, 2007; Kunst, Thomsen, & Sam, 2014; Wike & Grim, 2010). However, very little is empirically known as to how Muslims construe the West as threatening Islamic existence, despite overwhelming qualitative literature and media reports suggesting such possibility (for a review, see Moghaddam, 2009). To fill this void, the aim of the present research was to investigate how Muslims perceive globalization representing the Western societies' dominance and superiority as identity threat and as realistic threats to Islamic existence. We demonstrate that these perceived threats, more specifically identity globalization threat, ignite religious fundamentalism and emanate from Muslims' sense of competitive victimhood portraying that the Muslims are the more afflicted compared to the Western people. Moreover, we show that this role of identity globalization threat in giving rise to Muslims' religious fundamentalism is more prominent when Muslims as a group are perceived as having high entitativity, a concept that is defined as "the degree of having the nature of an entity, of having real existence" (Campbell, 1958, p. 17).

Religious Fundamentalism in Response to Globalization

Religious fundamentalism, according to its most widely cited definition within social psychology literature, has to do with “the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118). Hood, Hill, and Williamson (2005), however, suggested that this noted definition of religious fundamentalism should be interpreted with care, because it turned out to be heavily laden with a specific context of religious movements in the West, more particularly Protestantism in America. These scholars accordingly emphasized the importance of defining religious fundamentalism not only in a generic term but also in a specific term by respecting the uniqueness of fundamentalism across multifarious religions. Indeed, religious fundamentalism as a phenomenon emerges in major religious groups as diverse as Christians (Pratt, 2010), Jews (Heilman, 2005), Muslims (Antoun, 2008; Milton-Edwards, 2013), Hindus (Brink & Mencher, 2014; Sen & Wagner, 2009), and Buddhists (Deegalle, 2004). However, albeit having some peculiar differences, religious fundamentalism across the major religions shares some commonalities such as close-mindedness, intolerance of ambiguity, and rejection of alternative worldviews (Moghaddam, 2008; Saroglou, 2002). Having these characteristics, religious fundamentalism has turned to positively predict prejudice (Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Laythe, Finkel, & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004) and foster negative attitudes towards religious outgroups (Johnson, Labouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham, & Carlisle, 2012; Kunst et al., 2014; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005) as well as minority groups such as homosexuals (Whitley, 2009), single mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997), and feminists (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011). Religious fundamentalism has also been cited as a catalyst of social conflicts (Adesoji, 2010, 2011; Pearce, 2004).

Fundamentalism is not unique to a religion (Herriot, 2007), but Muslims' religious fundamentalism has drawn a special attention (Hiro, 2013). This is the case because Muslims' religious fundamentalism has been blamed as inspiring some Muslims to support and even perpetrate religious violence in the form of terrorism (Ben-Dor & Pedahzur, 2003; Ismail & Ungerer, 2009; Tan, 2008). Notwithstanding plenty of prior empirical studies confirming the role of religious fundamentalism in producing a host of negative intergroup attitudes and behaviors, studies on antecedents of religious fundamentalism in general and Muslims' religious fundamentalism in particular are ironically still lacking. As argued by Moghaddam (2009), Muslims' religious fundamentalism in part

is spurred by so called fractured globalization, that is, globalization that has revolutionized transportation and communication technology facilitating and expediting enormous people migrations around the globe. Contacts among people with diverging ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds are an unavoidable corollary of globalization, which renders individuals and groups confronted with new contradictions and stresses. This fractured globalization gives rise to Muslims' religious fundamentalism because Muslims fear that Western secularization asserting the domination of global culture subjugates Islamic traditions and communities. In this regard, Muslims see globalization as Westernization, and more specifically Americanization, which threatens the continuity of Muslims' unique culture and identity. This identity threat in turn evokes religious fundamentalism and even radicalization and terrorism among Islamic communities around the globe (Moghaddam, 2006).

The rationales that globalization can be accountable for cultivating religious fundamentalism are in line with some theories. For example, Terror Management Theory (TMT: Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) posits that culture functions as a psychological defense to deal with terror that can endanger human existence. In the lens of TMT, as pointed out by Salzman (2008), globalization may provoke religious fundamentalism because it threatens the sustainability or continuity of traditional culture or values of a religion which people deeply appreciate. This identity or cultural threat signifies an existential terror, and religious fundamentalism serves as a defensive coping mechanism to alleviate anxiety emanating from this terror. Religious fundamentalism in this regard drives Muslims to tighten up to the standards of traditional values and norms. Heightened appeals to these traditional values and norms may constitute a medium through which Muslims try to reduce anxiety of being confronted with omnipotent Western secularization that undermines Islamic culture.

Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1986) postulates that the leit-motif of people to be members of a group is to gain and maintain positive self-esteem. Under threat, more particularly distinctiveness threat in which the uniqueness of ingroup's culture and values are undermined by outgroup, people in an attempt to preserve their positive self-esteem are more motivated to confirm their group by showing stronger ingroup loyalty (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). Globalization also poses distinctiveness threat in which Western secularization tends to homogenize the world, displacing traditional culture and norms (Salzman, 2008) including the Islamic ones (Moghaddam, 2006, 2009). From the perspective of the SIT, Muslims' religious fundamentalism indicates group affirmation in response to globalization that threatens Islamic

distinctiveness by being more loyal to Islamic traditions and culture. This loyalty can be a foundation on which religious fundamentalism encourages Muslims to maintain their positive self-esteem in facing with globalization.

However, globalization also asserts the supremacy of the Western societies in terms of economy, technology, and politics, the supremacy of which has elicited Muslims' perception that globalization is realistically threatening Islamic existence (Fair & Shepherd, 2006; Robison, Crenshaw, & Jenkins, 2006). Although realistic threat has been found to trigger multifaceted negative intergroup attitudes, the same way as identity threat (see Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006 for a review), religious fundamentalism in general arises time of identity crisis (Monroe & Kreidie, 1997). This identity crisis refers to "a crisis of identity by those who fear extinction as a people or their absorption into an overarching culture to such a degree that their distinctiveness is undermined in the rush to homogeneity" (Marty & Appleby, 1991, Chapters 15–16). In a similar vein, Muslims' religious fundamentalism, as said by Monroe and Kreidie (1997), reflects a defensive reaction to globalization and modernization as a threat to Islamic identity instead of a threat to Islamic power or economy. This implies that globalization may instigate religious fundamentalism especially when Muslims construe it as iconizing identity threat rather than realistic threat.

The Effect of Competitive Victimhood on Threat Perception

We argue that the extent to which Muslims perceive globalization as a threat to Islamic identity depends on members of this religious group's competitive victimhood. Noor, Brown, and Prentice (2008) defined competitive victimhood as a belief in having anguished more than other groups. Competitive victimhood can manifest in two ways: direct and indirect (Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & Nadler, 2012). Direct competitive victimhood results from people's perception that they personally suffer from injury or losses due to an outgroup's acts of victimization. Indirect competitive victimhood ensues when people witness the agony of their fellow ingroup members at the hands of the outgroup. The opposing concept of competitive victimhood is termed common or inclusive victimhood referring to an inclusive construal of victim role between adversaries in dispute in which each adversary acknowledges the same degree of victimization (Shnabel, Halabi, & Noor, 2013; Vollhardt, 2013). As decreasing psychological capitals such as trust, empathy, and forgiveness, competitive victimhood is a detrimental factor contributing to escalation of conflicts and hindrance for these conflicts' reconciliation (Noor et al., 2012). On the contrary,

common victimhood is a beneficial factor promoting positive, prosocial intergroup attitudes (Shnabel et al., 2013; Vollhardt & Bilali, 2014).

Claim for direct competitive victimhood among Muslims originates from prejudice, discrimination, and even violence members of this religious group experience living in the Western countries as a minority group more pronouncedly after the tragedy of 9/11 (Brüß, 2008; Jikeli, 2012). One factor that triggers indirect or vicarious competitive victimhood among Muslims stems from members of this religious group's observation on the perceived predicaments Palestinian people have suffered in intractable conflicts with Israel in which the United States deemed as symbolizing the most powerful Western country is portrayed as continuously taking part on the side of Israel (Baines et al., 2006; Jikeli, 2012). On one side, according to the Model of Reconciliation Orientation (ROM: Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008), competitive victimhood gives rise to ingroup identification. In another side, the model of group identity lens (Turner & Reynolds, 2001) specifies that group identification provides a lens through which people see and make a meaning of the world. Group identification makes people more sensitive and curious towards anything than may threaten or harm their own group—higher identification therefore leads to higher threat perception. Building on these rationales, we contend that the more Muslims feel competitive victimhood in their intergroup relation with Western people, the more they perceive globalization as a threat to Islamic identity.

The Moderating Role of Group Entitativity

According to Uncertainty-Identity Theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2012), threats generate people's uncertainty and to ward off this uncertainty, people may adopt more defensive, protective behaviors. These behaviors can take form in identification with a group, and people do so more strongly when they are facing a threat combined with the perception that the group they identify with has high entitativity (Hogg, Sherman, Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffit, 2007). Group is said to have high entitativity if this group is perceived as having members who share great similarity, proximity, common fate, and boundedness (Castano, Sacchi, & Gries, 2003).

Some studies have examined uncertainty-identity theory in the context of radical or extreme behaviors. Hogg, Meehan, and Farquharson (2010) for instance found that under threat, people more strongly identified with radical groups and behave accordingly than with moderate groups. The key reasoning to explain this finding is that to reduce uncertainty emanating from a threat, identification with radical groups perceived as having high entitativity is more

appealing than identification with moderate groups perceived as having low entitativity. As religions are highly entitative groups providing believers with strict guidelines that pervade their life, religiosity therefore can be transformed into extremism and zealotry when people are confronted with a threat that undermines their identity (Hogg & Alderman, 2013; Hogg, Adelman, & Blagg, 2010). With this line of reasoning, we contend that as a corollary of the perception that globalization poses identity threat, Muslims can be more religiously fundamentalist, more particularly when they consider that Muslims have high entitativity.

The Current Research

Indonesia is home to 200 million of Sunni Muslims representing the Islamic majority group. Among this majority are a Muslim minority group of approximately 100,000 Shiites and 400,000 Ahmadis (Budiman, 2013). Religious fundamentalism in Indonesia has been on the rise manifesting in multifarious Sunni radical groups since the fall of Suharto's authoritarian regime on May 1998. What these groups have in common is their incessant aspiration to uphold Islamic Law in Indonesia and their complete anti-Western sentiments (Burhani, 2014). In support of this description, Muluk, Sumaktoyo, and Ruth (2013) recently found that religious fundamentalism among Indonesian Sunni Muslims positively predicted endorsement for Islamic Law and violent Jihad.

This research consisted of two studies. Participants in both studies were Sunni Muslims as the Islamic majority group in Indonesia. Study 1 was a correlational survey as a preliminary step to test the hypothesis specified. Study 2 was to replicate and extend the finding in Study 1 employing a different sample and a field experiment instead of a survey. In Study 1, all main variables including competitive victimhood, identity globalization threat, realistic globalization threat, and Muslims' religious fundamentalism are measured using a scale. In Study 2, we manipulated competitive victimhood by means of a message framing using a different scenario or vignette. Across these two studies, competitive victimhood is operationalized as vicarious or indirect victimhood (see Noor et al., 2012) in which participants are not personally stricken by the conflict assumed to pit Muslims against Western people. All scales and study materials in both studies were administered in Indonesian, using a standard procedure of forward-backward translation. The first author initially translated the original English version of the relevant scales into Indonesian. Then, an independent bilingual who is proficient in Indonesian and English

translated back the Indonesian version of the scales into English. The next procedure was comparing the original English scales to the bilingual's English scales conducted by the first author, in order to check language biases. The last procedure was refining the Indonesian version of the scales based on the existing language biases.

Study 1

The purpose of Study 1 was to test the notion that identity globalization threat instead of realistic globalization threat would mediate the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims' religious fundamentalism. Drawing on the Model of Reconciliation Orientation (ROM: Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008) and Model of Group Identity Lens (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), we argue that a sense that Muslims suffer more than Western people increases social identification with other fellow Muslims, rendering the Muslims to perceive that globalization asserting the West's supremacy as a threat to Islamic identity. Moreover, globalization as a threat to Islamic identity may increase Muslims' anxiety (see Terror Management Theory: Pyszczynski, et al., 2003) or decrease Muslims' self-esteem (see Social Identity Theory: Tajfel & Turner, 1986). To alleviate the anxiety and regain the self-esteem, Muslims can intensify their commitment to Islamic traditions and their loyalty to Islam by showing high religious fundamentalism. However, as contended by Monroe and Kreidie (1997), religious fundamentalism in general relates more to identity crisis in terms of culture or value incompatibility rather than realistic crisis in terms of power or economic deprivation. Albeit globalization also poses a threat to Muslims' economic, political, and technological standings, this kind of realistic threat is thus far less likely to trigger Muslims' religious fundamentalism. Building on these arguments, we accordingly specified the hypothesis that "identity globalization threat but not realistic globalization threat would mediate the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims' religious Fundamentalism (*Hypothesis 1*)."

Method

Participants and Design

Of 119 participants (83 females and 31 males; $M_{age} = 20.07$; $SD_{age} = 1.38$), 32 were undergraduate students from Islamic State University of Pontianak (IAIN Pontianak), West Kalimantan, and 87 were undergraduate students

from Islamic State University of Antasari (IAIN Antasari), South Kalimantan, Indonesia. Most participants were ethnically non-Javanese ($n = 115$) and a small number of them were ethnically Javanese ($n = 4$), all of whom self-reported as a Sunni Muslim. The design of Study 1 was a correlational survey in which all variables were measured instead of manipulated.

2

Procedure and Measures

The administration of this study was in a classroom, wherein we distributed 2 participants scales to measure all variables compiled in a questionnaire. Unless otherwise indicated, all variables were assessed using a 5-point *Likert* scale on which we asked participants to indicate their agreement with a statement (3 = *strongly disagree*, 5 = *strongly agree*). Scales were created by averaging the items. The first part of the questionnaire was 5 items to measure Competitive Victimhood (e.g., "Across the world, compared to Western people, Muslims experienced more discrimination and violence," "There is no difference between Muslims and Western people concerning their misery as a victim of discrimination and violence across the globe" [reverse]; $\alpha = .70$). One of these items was adapted from the study by Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, and Rothschild (2012); three of them were adapted from the study by Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, Manzi, and Lewis (2008); a single reverse item was created by the authors. Following this scale was 6 items to measure Identity Globalization Threat (e.g., "I am very concerned about the values and cultures of globalization that are not in line with Muslim ways of life," "The possibility that the values and culture of globalization will continue to displace and weaken the values and culture of Islam is something that deeply worries me"; $\alpha = .86$) and 6 items to measure Realistic Threat (e.g., "I fear that globalization will weaken the economy of Islamic world in the 2-ter-state competition," "I fear that globalization will attenuate the powers of the Islam 2 world in the global competition"; $\alpha = .85$). These two scales were adapted from the study by Mashuri, Zaduqisti, Sakdiah, and Sukmawati (2014). The second part of the questionnaire was 20 items of Religious Fundamentalism (e.g., "God has given mankind a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which must be totally followed," "All of the religions in the world has flaws and wrong teachings [reverse]"; $\alpha = .64$), adapted from the study by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992). Hunsberger (1996) has found that this scale has a good reliability and validity among non-Christian adult samples of Muslims, Hindus, and Jews. At the end of the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate their Islamic denominations, be they Sunni, Shi'a, or Ahmadiyya, along with other demographics including age, gender, ethnicity, and university affiliation. Upon finishing, we debriefed and thanked participants.

TABLE 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables in Study 1

Variables	M	SD	t	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
(1) Age				–	.16	.06	–.05	–.23*	–.03	.02	–.14
(2) Gender					–	–.11	–.07	–.13	–.08	–.03	–.15
(3) Ethnicity						–	–.31**	–.15	–.05	.03	–.02
(4) University							–	.01	–.07	.24**	–.04
(5) Perceived Victimhood	4.02	.60	18.68***					–	.29**	.14	.16
(6) Symbolic Globalization Threat	4.22	.70	18.95***						–	.59**	.24**
(7) Realistic Globalization Threat	3.79	.84	10.26***							–	.04
(8) Islamic Fundamentalism	3.61	.43	15.56***								–

Results

2

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 presented descriptive statistics and intercorrelations among variables in Study 1. As shown in Table 1, analyses of one-sample *t* test showed that all measured variable were high as they were significantly above the midpoint of 3.

Mediation Analysis

To test the hypothesis, we used PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes, 2013) in which Religious Fundamentalism was entered as outcome variable, Competitive Victimhood as independent variable, Identity Globalization Threat as mediator, and all demographic variables as covariates. Following a recommendation by Hayes (2013), we resampled the data 5000 times. The PROCESS Model 4 revealed that Identity Globalization Threat significantly mediated the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism (both indirect effect = .042, both *SE* = .034, 95% *LLCI* = .003, 95% *ULCI* = .135). The same PROCESS Model 4 by exchanging Symbolic Globalization Threat with Realistic Globalization Threat as mediator resulted in non-significant mediation effect (both indirect effect = .006, both *SE* = .014, 95% *LLCI* = -.013, 95%

$ULCI = .048$). To examine so called a feedback model in which outcome variable (Y) may also cause mediator (M), with reference to Kenny's (2014) procedure, we conducted an analysis of reverse causal effect by interchanging Religious Fundamentalism as mediator and Identity Globalization Threat as outcome variable, controlling for all demographic variables. This alternative analysis revealed that Religious Fundamentalism did not significantly mediate the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Identity Globalization Threat (bootstrapped indirect effect = .027, bootstrapped $SE = .027$, 95% $LLCI = -.011$, 95% $ULCI = .103$). All of these findings overall corroborated *Hypothesis 1* predicting that Identity Globalization Threat instead of Realistic Globalization Threat mediated the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism.

Conclusion

Study 1 revealed that identity globalization threat significantly mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims' religious fundamentalism, ruling out as predicted the mediating role of realistic globalization threat. The alternative mediation model drawing on Kenny's (2014) reverse causal effect specifying religious fundamentalism as mediator and symbolic globalization threat as a criterion also proved to be not significant, substantiating the plausibility of the hypothesized model.

To our knowledge, this is the first study to empirically reveal that competitive victimhood increased the perception that globalization is a threat to Islamic identity and in turn this perceived identity threat significantly fostered Muslims' religious fundamentalism. However, we could not claim in this study the causative effect of competitive victimhood as this independent variable is measured through a correlational survey instead of manipulated in experimentation. Moreover, a replication study employing a different sample is required to verify the robustness and consistency of the empirical finding in Study 1, which is the main goal of Study 2.

Study 2

The goal of Study 2 is twofold. First, Study 2 is to replicate the finding in Study 1 in which identity globalization threat and not realistic globalization threat mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on religious fundamentalism. Second, Study 2 is to extend Study 1 by including group entitativity as moderator. Uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2000, 2007, 2012) suggests that reli-

gious fundamentalism reflects a defensive behavior to alleviate uncertainty stemming from threats and people do such behavior more strongly when they perceive their religious group as having high entitativity. With reference to these rationales, we proposed two hypotheses. We predicted that “only when Muslims perceived their religious group as having high entitativity, identity globalization threat but not realistic globalization threat would increase religious fundamentalism (*Hypothesis 2*).” We also predicted that “only when Muslims perceived their religious group as having high entitativity, identity globalization threat but not realistic globalization threat would mediate the effect of competitive victimhood on religious fundamentalism (*Hypothesis 3*).”

Method

Participants and Design

Participants were 144 undergraduate students and 11 postgraduate students from Islamic State University of Pekalongan (STAIN Pekalongan), Central Java, Indonesia (105 females and 38 males, 12 participants did not indicate their gender; $M_{\text{age}} = 21.65$; $SD_{\text{age}} = 4.34$). All participants were ethnically Javanese and reported as a Sunni Muslim. The design of Study 2 was a field experiment, in which participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: high competitive victimhood ($n = 79$) or low competitive victimhood ($n = 76$).

Procedure and Measures

We conducted the field experiment in a classroom in which scales and other study materials compiled in a questionnaire were distributed to participants. Scales were created by averaging the items on which participants were asked to indicate their agreement with a statement ranging between 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The first part of the questionnaire was 5 items to measure Entitativity, adapted from the study by Castano et al. (2003: “Muslims have many characteristics in common,” “Muslims share a common past experience”; $\alpha = .87$). The second part was a bogus article about the current official reports released by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion on agony and losses Muslims around the globe have experienced in comparison to Western people in the history of intergroup conflicts involving both parties. This article was ostensibly published in a well-known newspaper in Indonesia, which serves as a manipulation of competitive victimhood. In the high competitive victimhood condition, the article reported that over the past decade the Muslims’ agony and losses had steadily increased and were projected to continuously increase in the near future. In the low competitive victimhood condition,

Muslims and Western people were described to share the same level of agony and losses over the past decade and this identical victimization were expected to be stable further in the near future. After this article, in the third part of the questionnaire participants were asked to answer 2 items to measure Perceived Competitive Victimhood ("Compared to Western people, Muslims experience higher degree of victimization," Muslims and Western people suffer from the same level of victimization" [reverse]; $r = .43, p < .001$) to check the effectiveness of the manipulation and 2 items ("I think that the article about discrimination and violence against Muslims reported above can be trusted," "I think that the article about discrimination and violence against Muslims reported above is unrealistic" [reverse]; $r = .26, p = .001$) to check the credibility of the article. These items were then followed by 6 items to measure Identity Globalization Threat ($\alpha = .73$), 6 items to measure Realistic Threat ($\alpha = .88$), and 20 items to measure Religious Fundamentalism ($\alpha = .67$) using the same scales as those in Study 1. At the end of the questionnaire, we asked participants to indicate their Islamic denomination (i.e., Sunni, Shi'a, or Ahmadiyya) and demographics. Upon finishing, participants were debriefed and thanked.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations among variables were presented in Table 2. As shown in this table, inspection of one sample *t* test analyses demonstrated that all measured variables turned out to be high as they significantly exceeded the midpoint of 3.

3 *Manipulation Check*

An analysis of independent-sample *t* test revealed that the degree of perceived competitive victimhood reported by participants in the high competitive victimhood condition ($M = 4.16, SD = .71$) was significantly higher than in the low competitive victimhood condition ($M = 3.13, SD = .68$), $t(152) = 9.18, p < .001$. The same analysis also revealed that participants' belief in the credibility of the article to manipulate victimhood in the high competitive victimhood condition ($M = 4.03, SD = .74$) compared to that in the low competitive victimhood condition ($M = 3.90, SD = .80$) was statistically not significant, $t(153) = 1.05, p = .295$. An analysis of one-sample *t* test revealed that the article was highly credible ($M = 3.97, SD = .77$) as it significantly exceeded the midpoint of 3, $t(154) = 2.632, p < .001$. Taken together, all of these findings confirmed that the scenario to manipulate victimhood was very effective.

TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables in Study 2

Variables	M	SD	t	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1) Age				–	.10	–.06	.04	.12	–.03	.05
(2) Gender					–	–.14	–.09	–.25**	–.23**	–.10
(3) Entitativity	4.18	.81	18.12***			–	.06	.07	.06	–.01
(4) Victimhood manipulation (high vs. low)							–	–.21**	.33**	.10
(5) Identity Globalization Threat	4.28	.61	25.99***					–	.47**	.30**
(6) Realistic Globalization Threat	3.88	.86	12.78***						–	.16
(7) Religious Fundamentalism	3.61	.45	16.96***							–

Mediation Analysis

To test the hypothesis that identity globalization threat but not realistic globalization threat mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on religious fundamentalism, we used PROCESS Model 4 (Hayes, 2013). In this model we specified Religious Fundamentalism as outcome variable, Competitive Victimhood Manipulation as independent variable, Identity Globalization Threat as mediator, Age and Gender as covariates. We did not include Ethnicity and University Affiliation as covariates since these demographic variables consisted of only one value. By resampling the data 5000 times, the PROCESS Model 4 revealed that Identity Globalization Threat significantly mediated the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism (both indirect effect = .046, both $SE = .027$, 95% $LLCI = .007$, 95% $ULCI = .116$). Entered as mediator in exchange of Identity Globalization Threat, Realistic Globalization Threat did not significantly mediate the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism (both indirect effect = .027, both $SE = .028$, 95% $LLCI = -.020$, 95% $ULCI = .092$). A reverse causal effect (Kenny, 2014) revealed that Religious Fundamentalism did not significantly mediate the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Identity Globalization Threat (both indirect effect = .026, both $SE = .027$, 95% $LLCI = -.013$, 95% $ULCI = .095$). These results

in sum were in line with those in Study 1, wherein the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism was mediated by the degree to which Muslims perceived globalization as an identity threat but not a realistic threat.

Moderated Mediation Analysis

To test the hypothesis that the role of Identity Globalization Threat in mediating the effect of Competitive Victimhood was contingent upon Entitativity, we followed two steps of regression analysis with reference to PROCESS Model 14 as suggested by Hayes (2013). In each of the two regression steps, Age and Gender were entered as covariates. The model specified group Entitativity as moderator theorized to structure the effect of Identity Globalization Threat on Religious Fundamentalism. As shown in Table 3, a simple regression analysis in the first step revealed that Identity Globalization Threat was significantly predicted by Competitive Victimhood. A multiple regression analysis in the second step regressed Religious Fundamentalism simultaneously on Competitive Victimhood, Symbolic Globalization Threat, Entitativity, and Symbolic Globalization Threat x Entitativity interaction, accounting for 11% of variance in Religious Fundamentalism. The significant coefficient of Identity Globalization Threat x Entitativity indicated that entitativity moderates the effect of Identity Globalization Threat on Religious Fundamentalism. To probe this interaction effect, we conducted Probing Interactions Procedure (PROCESS, Hayes & Matthes, 2009) in which Religious Fundamentalism was entered as dependent variable (Y), Identity Globalization Threat as focal predictor (F), Entitativity as moderator (M), Age and Gender as covariates. As shown in Figure 1, the results revealed that supporting Hypothesis 2, Identity Globalization Threat increased Religious Fundamentalism only among participants holding that Muslims as a group have high entitativity ($B = .334$, $SE = .09$, $p < .001$). When Muslims were perceived as having low entitativity, the effect of Identity Globalization Threat on Religious Fundamentalism was no longer significant ($B = .005$, $SE = .10$, $p = .960$). Finally, as shown in Figure 2A and 2B, the PROCESS Model 14 demonstrated that the role of Identity Globalization Threat in mediating the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism was significant when Muslims are perceived as having high entitativity (1SD above the Mean, booth indirect effect = .087, booth $SE = .044$, 95% $LLCI = .021$, 95% $ULCI = .194$) instead of low entitativity (1SD below the Mean, booth indirect effect = .001, booth $SE = .034$, 95% $LLCI = -.077$, 95% $ULCI = .066$). On the contrary, the indirect effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism via Realistic Globalization Threat was not significant, either when Muslims are perceived as having high entitativity (1SD above the Mean, booth indirect effect = .022, booth $SE = .036$, 95% $LLCI = -.041$, 95%





FIGURE 1 The effect of Identity Globalization Threat on Religious Fundamentalism among participants holding Muslims as having high entitativity and low entitativity

TABLE 3 Two step regression analyses of model coefficients for the conditional PROCESS Model 14

Antecedent	M (Identity Globalization Threat)			Y (Religious Fundamentalism)		
	B	SE	p	B	SE	p
X (Victimhood)	.27	.10	.009	.03	.07	.740
M (Identity Globalization Threat)	-	-	-	-.72	.39	.070
V (Entitativity)	-	-	-	-.91	.40	.025
M × V	-	-	-	.21	.09	.023
Age	.02	.01	.098	-.002	.01	.834
Gender	-.29	.11	.010	-.01	.08	.890
Constant	3.80	.26	< .001	6.76	1.73	< .001
	R ² = .12			R ² = .11		
	F(3,131) = 5.73, p = .001			F(6,128) = 2.58, p = .022		

Note. X = Independent variable; Y = Dependent variable; M = Mediator; V = Moderator; M × V = Product of Mediator and Moderator



3
 Note: B is an unstandardized regression coefficient, SE is a standard error. The path from Identity Globalization Threat to Religious Fundamentalism is the effect of Identity Globalization Threat on Religious Fundamentalism by controlling for Competitive Victimhood. The number in parenthesis is the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism while controlling for Identity Globalization Threat. ** = $p < .01$; ns = not significant.

2
 FIGURE 2. (A) The role of Identity Globalization Threat in mediating the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism among participants perceiving Muslims as having high group Entitativity, (B) The role of Identity Globalization Threat in mediating the effect of Competitive Victimhood on Religious Fundamentalism among participants perceiving Muslims as having low group Entitativity

3
 $ULCI = .108$) or low entitativity (1SD below the Mean, booth indirect effect = .031, booth $SE = .042$, 95% $LLCI = -.047$, 95% $ULCI = .121$). These results in sum substantiated Hypothesis 3.

Conclusion

Using a different method and sample, Study 2 replicated the finding in Study 1 wherein identity globalization threat but not realistic globalization threat

mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on religious fundamentalism. An alternative reverse causal effect by interchanging identity globalization threat as a criterion and religious fundamentalism as mediator turned out to be not significant, confirming the plausibility of the hypothesized model over the alternative model. Study 2 also revealed that group entitativity moderated the effect of identity globalization threat on religious fundamentalism such that only when Muslims perceived their religious group as having high entitativity that higher identity globalization threat triggered higher religious fundamentalism. Finally, Study 2 found as hypothesized that the role of identity globalization threat in mediating the effect of competitive victimhood on religious fundamentalism was contingent upon group entitativity. More precisely, only when Muslims perceived their religious group as having high entitativity that identity globalization threat significantly mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on religious fundamentalism.

General Discussion

Existing literature on how the Western people perceive Muslims and Islam as posing multifarious threats especially after the 9/11 is voluminous. However, empirical studies conversely examining Muslims' threat perception on the West are still underdeveloped, which was the goal of the current research. We found across two studies that globalization as identity threat, but not realistic threat, iconizing the West's domination significantly mediated the effect of competitive victimhood on Muslims' religious fundamentalism. However, this mediating role of identity globalization threat as found in Study 2 as expected held only when Muslims perceived their religious group as having high entitativity.

This research potentially provides a novelty in explaining religious fundamentalism in light of situational factors instead of individual or personality ones which have been conclusively examined in the previous studies. However, more studies are in need of establishing the findings in this study and examining their generalizability in varying religions other than Islam. The findings across two studies that identity threat but not realistic threat impacted on rising religious fundamentalism may critically complement Integrated Threat Theory (ITT: Stephan & Stephan, 2000) in two ways. First, ITT does not specifically delineate how symbolic or identity threat and realistic threat potentially have discriminant effects on negative group attitudes and behaviors. Second, ITT heavily focuses on the effect of intergroup threats on negative outgroup attitudes and therefore pays little attention on how identity threat and realistic threat cause attitudes toward ingroup (but see Karasawa, Karasawa, & Hirose, 2004; Steele, Parker, & Lickel, 2014).

The finding in this study that globalization as identity threat ignited religious fundamentalism is in line with the model of religion's dual function as a social identity (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). This model describes that religion on one side can promote people's well-being as it provides them with epistemological and ontological certainty. On another side, however, religion can have equally a negative consequence in promoting radicalism or extremism in terms of religious fundamentalism, especially when religious identity is perceived as under threat. However, as described by Monroe and Kreidie (1997) and as found in this research, the threat that may turn religion into fundamentalism has to do more with identity threat instead of realistic threat, wherein globalization is portrayed as identity crisis that can undermine the sustainability of religious traditions.

Terror Management Theory (TMT: Pyszczynski, et al., 2003) posits that inter-group threats give rise to uncertainty and religious fundamentalism can be a medium through which people want to alleviate anxiety in confronting with the uncertainty. Meanwhile, Social Identity Theory (SIT: Tajfel & Turner, 1986) describes that religious fundamentalism functions as a means by which people want to preserve their positive social identity or self-esteem when this identity is perceived as under threat. Drawing on these theories we hypothesized and found that the more Muslims perceive globalization as a threat to their Islamic identity the more they self-reported religious fundamentalism. However, to make the truism of the two theories more explicit, next studies require measuring anxiety and self-esteem following religious fundamentalism. In line with TMT, religious fundamentalism should negatively predict the anxiety and vice versa, in line with SIT, religious fundamentalism should positively predict self-esteem.

We argue in this present research that competitive victimhood may lead Muslims to conceive globalization as a threat to Islamic identity because, with reference to the Model of Reconciliation Orientation (ROM: Noor, Brown, and Prentice, 2008), it enhances Islamic identification. In turn, this identification, as explicated in the model of Group Identity Lens (Turner & Reynolds, 2001), lead Muslims to be more sensitive and vulnerable to see globalization as threatening Islamic identity. Next studies therefore need to include Islamic identification to verify that this variable mediates the effect of competitive victimhood on the perception that globalization is a threat to Islamic identity. However, a meta-analysis by van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) found that "politicized identity," which refers to identification with members of a disadvantaged group in a power struggle more than general group identification, led people to endorse more for radical collective actions such as protest and demonstration. In this regard, next studies may also measure identification

with Palestinian Muslims, which is presumably stronger than identification with Muslims in general in mediating the effect of victimhood on the perception that globalization poses a threat to Islamic identity.

We found across two studies that the reliabilities of Muslim's religious fundamentalism were moderate ($\alpha = .67$ in Study 1, $\alpha = .67$ in Study 2). These findings are potentially attributable to the fact that the original version of religious fundamentalism scale by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) is not immune to religious content bias (Williamson, Hood, Ahmad, Sadiq, & Hill, 2010). To overcome this bias, Kunst et al. (2014) for example recently modified Altemeyer and Hunsberger's (2004) religious fundamentalism scale by replacing general terms with specific ones, in order to suit it to Muslims. For example, "God" was replaced by "Allah," "religion" by "Islam," and "sacred scripture" by "Qur'an." With these modifications, these authors arrived at a satisfying reliability of Muslim's religious fundamentalism ($\alpha = .88$, Study 1). Next studies hence need carrying out this procedure to achieve more reliable scale of Muslims' religious fundamentalism.

Based on empirical findings elaborated above, we proposed some practical implications. A common ingroup identity has been found to reduce competitive victimhood by enhancing people's perspective-taking and trust (Andrighetto, Mari, Volpato, & Behluli, 2012). In a similar vein, the study by Shnabel et al. (2013) found that inducing adversaries in conflict (i.e., Israeli Jews and Palestinians) a common victim identity decreased competitive victimhood. Common identity also significantly contributed to increase intergroup forgiveness (Cehajic, Brown, & Castano, 2008). The facilitation of this intergroup forgiveness, a psychological capital that is very important in promoting reconciliation, requires reducing competitive victimhood (Shnabel et al., 2013). In short, to deal with reduction of competitive victimhood, these findings shed light on the importance of cultivating and maintaining a common identity between parties in dispute which fosters an inclusive categorization of "We-ness" instead of exclusive categorization of "Us versus Them" (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2009). Moghaddam (2009, 2012) suggested so called "omniculturalism" as a practical policy to materialize the importance of common identity in solving subgroup or ingroup exclusionisms in the current fractured globalization. Omniculturalism policy takes in two steps. The first step is to develop a common identity as a primary identity. To this end, schools and other institutions of socialization in Indonesia should encourage children to learn about human commonalities that emphasize awareness on human beings' similarity. Once this primary identity is internalized, children then learn to develop a secondary identity based on their membership in subgroups such as ethnicity, gender, profession, religion, and so forth. However,

the key goal of omniculturalism policy is to ascertain that the primary identity (i.e., common identity) is more important than the secondary identity (i.e., ingroup identity).

Second, intergroup contact has been confirmed to decrease competitive victimhood (Andrighetto et al., 2012) and conversely increase intergroup forgiveness (Cehajic et al., 2008) by promoting outgroup trust and perspective taking. Coherent with these findings, a meta-analysis by Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) concluded that intergroup contact is substantially effective in reducing prejudice by enhancing knowledge and decreasing anxiety about outgroup. Policy makers in Indonesia could enhance intergroup contact with the Western people through bilateral or multilateral cooperation in terms of, for example, student exchange and cross-cultural exhibition (Mashuri, Hasanah, & Rahmawati, 2012; Mashuri, Zaduqisti, & Supriyono, 2013).

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