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2

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2 Abstract

Victims of natural or humanitarian disasters sometimes resist aid offered to them, resulting in slower recovery among victims, and feelings of rejection among aid offerers. We present two studies conducted in Indonesia that investigated motives for spurning offers of humanitarian aid. Both studies showed that beliefs in developed countries' conspiracies lead participants to see humanitarian aid as guided by strategic rather than prosocial motives. Perceived strategic motives in turn enhanced aid resistance, whereas perceived prosocial motives decreased resistance. Conspiratorial beliefs and aid resistance were positively predicted by national collective narcissism (Study 1) and intergroup conflict (Study 2). Together, these findings show that humanitarian aid resistance arises from the recipients' beliefs in malignant intentions of the providers.

Keywords

collective narcissism, conspiratorial beliefs, humanitarian aid resistance, intergroup conflict, motives for outgroup helping

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Large-scale natural disasters with devastating material and human costs often elicit vast international initiatives to relieve the aftermath. Yet despite the often dire circumstances of the victimised group or countries, resistance to humanitarian international relief offers is common. Relief offers after the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan, the 2007 flooding in China, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina in the United States, the 2008 cyclone in Myanmar, and the 2004 tsunami in India all met with some form of local or governmental resistance to the offered aid (Dany, 2018; Farley, 2008; Jenkins & Berger, 2008; Nelson, 2010). The costs of such resistance are high, as it

can mean that less help reaches the victimised areas than needed (Farley, 2008; Jenkins & Berger, 2008). For example, almost 50% of the \$854 million granted by foreign countries for disaster

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victims or reconstruction after Hurricane Katrina that devastated large areas of New Orleans in 2005 went unused, due to the U.S. government's policy to only accept funds from allies (Solomon & Hsu, 2007). Spurned help offers may also damage the relationship between helpers and recipients, as the former can feel rejected that their offer is declined (Cheuk & Rosen, 1996). To date, little is known about the reasons why offered humanitarian aid is sometimes rejected. It is therefore of vital importance that we investigate the motives underlying humanitarian aid resistance. To this end, we present two studies in the current paper in which we investigated how perceptions of the helper's motives affected help resistance.

The background of the current research was humanitarian aid resistance in the Republic of Indonesia. Many studies on outgroup helping have been conducted in the confines of a laboratory setting, limiting both the ecological validity and thematic scope of this research (Alvarez et al., 2018). Moreover, the limited previous work on help resistance has overwhelmingly relied on Western samples. As a result, we know very little about resistance to humanitarian aid that is offered by wealthy industrialised countries to developing countries. Filling this gap, the present research used Indonesian samples that are not well represented in the literature on help resistance.

Natural Disasters and Humanitarian Aid in Indonesia

Over the past two decades, Indonesia has suffered various natural disasters, ranging from volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, to tsunamis, with enormous social and economic costs (Indonesia Investments, 2018). The December 2004 tsunami that stroke Aceh and North Sumatra is well known, and took the lives of 170,000 people (Gaillard et al., 2008). Other current examples are the September 2018 earthquake and tsunami in Palu and Donggala, Central Sulawesi, with 4,340 deaths reported (Sangadji, 2019), and the December 2018 tsunami in Sunda Straits with a death toll of 437 (Muthiariny, 2018).

In responding to foreign humanitarian aid for major natural disasters, the Indonesian government has not easily accepted. For example, Indonesia has resisted several offers of foreign aid in the aftermath of the earthquake and tsunami in Palu and Donggala, Central Sulawesi, on September 2018 (Lyons, 2018; Riana, 2018), as well as aid offers following a volcano-triggered tsunami in Sunda Straits on December 2018 (Cornish, 2019). There are, therefore, concrete examples showing that within the Indonesian context, international humanitarian aid offered to areas afflicted by natural disasters can be met with rejection.

Perceived Motives for Outgroup Helping and Resistance to Humanitarian Aid

International relief efforts can be construed as a form of outgroup helping. That is, international aid is a form of helping in which the helper and help recipient are from different groups—in this case, different nationalities (van Leeuwen, 2017; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010). Previous research has shown that people resist outgroup help when it threatens their group esteem (e.g., national pride; Farley, 2008), as well as their reputation as a powerful (Jenkins & Berger, 2008) or competent group (Täuber & van Leeuwen, 2017). Resistance to outgroup help is also caused by how help recipients evaluate the help provider. For example, people oppose help offered by an outgroup that is considered morally superior (Täuber & van Zomeren, 2012) or that holds negative stereotypes about the ingroup (Wakefield et al., 2013).

In the current paper, we examined the extent to which the help offered to a group is perceived to be guided by strategic motives versus prosocial motives, and how each of these perceived motives impacts humanitarian aid resistance. Strategic motives for outgroup help are oriented to meet the help providers' needs, such as asserting dominance or power as well as demonstrating warmth and competence (van Leeuwen, 2017). The literature suggests that helping

interactions in and of themselves are unequal (e.g., Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010). Help providers are typically portrayed as rich, powerful, and of high status, while help recipients are depicted as poor, powerless, and of low status. Through helping, providers can maintain influence and control over help recipients (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Halabi, 2006).

Outgroup helping may also serve to establish an image as warm or competent. Indeed, the act of helping is universally seen as friendly and generous, and may simultaneously signal the helper's wealth or qualifications. The motivation to demonstrate such warmth or competence through helping reflects an impression management strategy, as people who are perceived as warm (e.g., helpful, friendly) or competent (e.g., intelligent, skilful) can induce positive feelings of admiration and behavioural tendencies of facilitation (Fiske et al., 2006). Indeed, the more people are motivated to demonstrate their group's warmth (Mashuri et al., 2012; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012) or competence (van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012), the more they are willing to help another group.

Prosocial motives for outgroup helping are rooted in help providers' feelings of empathy towards the recipients (van Leeuwen, 2017). Empathy is thought to derive from one's genuine concern for the well-being of other people (Aronson et al., 2005). Characterised as such, according to the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991), empathy may prompt people towards helping others without considering the costs of the act of helping.

The interpretation of humanitarian aid as either strategic or prosocial has clear relevance in the Indonesian context, as illustrated by the following example. In 2015, in his appeal to release two Australians who were sentenced to death for trafficking drugs into Indonesia in 2006, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbot stated that Indonesia should remember the humanitarian aid his country had granted after the December 2004 tsunami (Hurst, 2015). In response, many Indonesians started to collect coins to pay back

Australia, as a form of protest. This anecdote suggests that when people are aware that humanitarian aid is guided more by strategic motives, they may resist the offered aid. This defensive mechanism, according to the model of help avoidance as motivated inaction (Täuber, 2017), serves to protect help recipients' needs for maintaining group power and positive identity vis-à-vis the providers. These psychological needs could be regained or protected by resisting the offered help. This suggests that people may think that they are better off resisting humanitarian aid when they believe that the providers of aid are driven by strategic and not prosocial motives. Indeed, one coordinator of the Indonesian coin collection protest referred to Australia's humanitarian aid with the words "If we knew they were not sincere, we would have rejected it" ("Indonesians Collect Coins," 2015).

Conspiratorial Beliefs and Perceived Motives for Humanitarian Aid

In the previous lines, we argued that resistance to humanitarian aid would be greater if the motives behind the offered aid are seen as strategic rather than prosocial. This begs a new question: What determines whether a helper's motives are seen as either strategic or prosocial? To answer this question, we examined the role of outgroup conspiratorial beliefs, denoting people's beliefs in a secret collaboration of outgroups with the aim of harming the ingroup (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). These conspiratorial beliefs are stronger when they involve outgroups that are more powerful or have higher status than the ingroup (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 2014; van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Given that most humanitarian aid that has been offered to Indonesia was offered by wealthier industrialised countries, the potential for inferring conspiratorial beliefs in this context is real.

The belief that humanitarian aid is offered by a party that, in reality, conspires against one's own group can have detrimental consequences in terms of how the aid offer is perceived. In a

recent study, Siem and Stürmer (2018) found that participants attributed an offer of help to more strategic or egoistic motives and to less prosocial or altruistic motives when the helper was of high status. Members of low-status groups are more likely to engage in this kind of attribution due to their proneness to assign high-status groups a conspirator role. In other words, the more members of low-status groups believe in high-status groups' conspiracies, the more they interpret the helping action by the latter as motivated by strategic instead of prosocial goals. This is because outgroup distrust is closely related to conspiratorial beliefs (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994). Conspiratorial beliefs may enhance the perception that high-status groups try to meet the needs of their group in offering help (i.e., a strategic motivational orientation). Thus, it can be argued that when help recipients believe that the provider has conspired to harm their group, they are more likely to view humanitarian aid as guided more by strategic motives.

Predictors of Conspiratorial Beliefs

If conspiratorial beliefs predict the perception of a helper's motive as either strategic or prosocial, then what predicts conspiratorial beliefs? In the current paper, we present two studies in which we looked at two different potential predictors of conspiratorial beliefs. Specifically, in Study 1, we investigated to what extent the individual factor of national collective narcissism contributed to conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance, and in Study 2, we looked at the extent to which intergroup conflict, as a situational factor, contributed to conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance.

Study 2 can be viewed as a conceptual replication of Study 1, using a more direct manipulation of perceptions of intergroup conflict. Collective narcissists tend to perceive intergroup situations as threatening since their belief in the superiority of their own group clashes with the perceptions of members of other groups (and often with reality). As a consequence, collective narcissists have a tendency to see their group as engaged in constant

conflict with other groups (Golec de Zavala, 2011). As such, both studies presented in this paper investigated the effect of perceived intergroup conflict on conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance, with conflict perceptions either rooted at the individual-difference factor of collective narcissism, or at the situational factor of existing intergroup conflict.

Both collective narcissism and perceptions of intergroup conflict may be stronger among members of low-status groups compared to members of high-status groups. Research revealed that the more ingroup members felt deprived (e.g., due to their low group status), the more they viewed that their group was disrespected by the higher status outgroup, paving the way for collective narcissism (Guerra et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018). Moreover, members of low-status groups are sensitive to cues suggesting that high-status or powerful outgroups have malevolent intentions against their group (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018), which enhances the perception of conflictive relations with the high-status outgroup (Riek et al., 2006). In the following paragraphs, we will explain why collective narcissism and intergroup conflict can both be thought of as predictors of the ingroup's tendency to believe in intergroup conspiracies.

Golec de Zavala et al. (2009) introduced the concept of national collective narcissism, referring to an insecure ingroup identification that reflects people's unrealistic demand that the greatness of their own group be recognised by the outgroup. Although the concept of narcissism itself originates from psychoanalysis, the definition of collective narcissism departs from its Freudian origins in which it is conceived as unconsciousness, abnormality, or personality (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Rather, collective narcissism denotes the belief in an exaggerated ingroup positive image, the level of which may fluctuate depending on intergroup or situational contexts. Outgroup's criticism is one such situational factor that can heighten ingroup members' collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala, 2011).

Due to its defensive characteristic, collective narcissism increases people's negative outgroup attitudes in general (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka,

2012; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013) and outgroup conspiratorial beliefs in particular (Cichočka et al., 2015; Cichočka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichočka, 2012). In addition to negative outgroup attitudes, collective narcissism also triggers rejection towards the outgroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). Accordingly, we argue that collective narcissism fosters people's beliefs in humanitarian aid providers' conspiratorial intentions and, ultimately their resistance to the offered aid.

In addition to collective narcissism, in this paper we looked at intergroup conflict as a potential predictor of conspiratorial beliefs. Van Prooijen and van Vugt (2018) argued that intergroup conflict can trigger conspiratorial beliefs because it is characterised by feelings of intergroup threat. Moreover, prior research (van Leeuwen et al., 2011) revealed that people resisted help offered by another group when those groups were in conflict. In support of this notion, Indonesia did not allow the Israeli government to deliver relief supplies for the 2004 tsunami victims in Aceh and North Sumatra due to the unresolved political dispute between the two countries over the issue of Palestine ("Indonesia Denies Allowing Israel," 2005). We thus reasoned that intergroup conflict can give rise to both conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance.

Negative Evaluations of Humanitarian Aid

Fisher et al. (2008) posited that intergroup help may be met with resistance, in part because the offer of help enhances the salience of the status gap between the donors (powerful, wealthy) and the recipients (inferior, poor). Under these conditions, recipients may interpret the offered help as reflecting ulterior motives rather than true liking and concern. Such negative evaluations of humanitarian aid may also reflect the perception that the offered aid undermines the recipient group's reputation (Carnegie & Dolan, 2015; Nelson, 2010). Being on the receiving end of help can have detrimental consequences for a group's reputation, casting the recipient in an incompetent and dependent light (Halabi &

Nadler, 2010; van Leeuwen, 2017; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010). Applying these insights to the context of our work, it makes sense to argue that negative evaluations of offered help can be a catalyst for help resistance. This notion was examined in Study 2.

Study 1

Study 1 examined participants' reactions to offers of international aid to the Republic of Indonesia in response to natural disasters, and focused on collective narcissism as a potential predictor of conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance. We hypothesised that collective narcissism would positively predict both participants' beliefs in developed countries' conspiratorial intentions (Hypothesis 1a) and their resistance to humanitarian aid (Hypothesis 1b). Participants' beliefs in developed countries' conspiratorial intentions were hypothesised to be positively related to the perception that the humanitarian aid was guided by strategic motives (Hypothesis 2a). In contrast, we expected that conspiratorial beliefs would be negatively related to participants' perception that the humanitarian aid was guided by prosocial motives (Hypothesis 2b). The more participants would perceive that humanitarian aid provided by developed countries was guided by strategic motives, the more they would resist the aid (Hypothesis 3a). In contrast, the more they would perceive that humanitarian aid was guided by prosocial motives, the less they would resist the aid (Hypothesis 3b).

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 233 undergraduate students from the IAIN Pekalongan, Indonesia (124 women, 97 men, 12 participants did not self-report their gender; $M_1 = 19.30$, $SD_{age} = 1.53$). The research design was a correlational survey in which participants took part on a voluntary and unpaid basis.

Procedure and measures. The survey was administered in a classroom. The questionnaire distributed to participants asked them to indicate their

Table 1. Correlations among observed variables: Study 1.

Variables	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Collective narcissism	3.76	0.56	–	.24**	.29**	.22**	.20**	.01	.28**
2. Conspiratorial beliefs	3.27	0.96		–	.61**	.36**	.34**	–.25**	.31**
3. Power or dominance	3.10	0.99			–	.60**	.57**	–.21**	.55**
4. Warmth	3.31	0.95				–	.68**	–.11	.45**
5. Competence	3.11	0.97					–	–.15*	.42**
6. Prosocial motives (empathy)	2.89	0.82						–	–.28**
7. Humanitarian aid resistance	2.85	0.93							–

Note. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$.

agreement with various statements on 5-point Likert scales (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *very much*). Following informed consent, participants were presented with the operational definition of humanitarian aid for natural disasters, as well as that of developed and developing countries. With reference to the World Bank (Nielsen, 2011), developed countries were defined as those with high-income economies, and developing countries as those with low- and middle-income economies. Based on this definition, Indonesia was categorised as one of the developing countries. Major natural disasters in Indonesian history such as the 2004 Aceh tsunami were then briefly described, as well as the humanitarian aid the Indonesian government had received from various developed countries. Participants subsequently completed a questionnaire.


National collective narcissism was assessed with nine items (e.g., “Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of the Indonesian nation”; $\alpha = .70$) adapted from Golec de Zavala et al. (2009). Conspiratorial beliefs were assessed with six items (e.g., “Developed countries have secretly collaborated with each other to undermine Indonesia’s existence”; $\alpha = .90$), and perceived intention to assert power or dominance with five items (e.g., “The humanitarian aid granted by developed countries aims to control Indonesian people”; $\alpha = .92$). These scales were developed by the authors to suit the context of the current research. Perceived intention to give a warmth impression was assessed with five items (e.g., “The humanitarian

aid granted by developed countries aims to make people from those countries appear generous in the eyes of Indonesian people”; $\alpha = .92$) adapted from van Leeuwen and Täuber (2012). Perceived intention to demonstrate competence was assessed with five items (e.g., “The humanitarian aid granted by developed countries aims to make people from those countries appear intelligent in the eyes of Indonesian people”; $\alpha = .93$) adapted from Fiske et al. (2002). Perceived intentions to assert dominance or power, to manage warmth impression, and to demonstrate competence were combined into a single measure of perceived strategic motives for outgroup helping. Prosocial motives for outgroup helping were assessed with six items (e.g., “The humanitarian aid granted by developed countries is based on feelings of sympathy towards Indonesian people”; $\alpha = .89$) adapted from Batson et al. (1997). Humanitarian aid resistance was assessed with eight items (e.g., “Indonesia would be better off by paying back instead of receiving the humanitarian aid granted by developed countries”; $\alpha = .94$) created by the authors. Upon indicating their age and gender, participants were debriefed and thanked.¹

Results and Discussion

Descriptive statistics. As can be seen in Table 1, all variables were positively correlated with humanitarian aid resistance, except for perceived prosocial motives for outgroup helping, which were negatively correlated with the resistance.

Figure 1. Results of the hypothesised model in Study 1.



Note. Numbers in the model are standardised path coefficients. All variables within the model were analysed in terms of their latent scores. *ns* = nonsignificant. ***p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

Hypothesis testing. Hypotheses 1a to 3b were tested by means of structural equation modelling (SEM) using Mplus Version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015).² We generated a hypothesised model and assessed it with MLM estimator suitable to nonmissing data that do not meet the assumption of multivariate normality (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015).³ In this structural model, observed variables were transformed into latent constructs that were derived from two techniques of item parcelling. The initial step was to determine the dimensionality of each construct using exploratory factor analysis with an oblique (i.e., promax) rotation, following the recommendation by Little et al. (2002). The second step was to choose the appropriate item parcelling technique based on the dimensionality of each construct. We used the item-to-construct balance technique to create parcels of unidimensional constructs (Little et al., 2002). Using this technique, we combined the highest factor loading item with the lowest factor loading item to create the first parcel. We created the subsequent parcels by combining items with the next highest and lowest factor loadings (Little et al., 2002).

The domain-representative technique was used to create parcels of multidimensional constructs (Kishton & Widaman, 1994). We preferred the domain-representative technique to

its reliability approach counterpart for multidimensional constructs, given that the first parcelling technique was found to be more stable (i.e., resulting in relatively similar parameters such as standard errors and path coefficients) across multiple studies, in contrast to the second parcelling technique (Kishton & Widaman, 1994; Little et al., 2002). Using the domain-representative technique, we created parcels by pairing items from different factors so as to make them represent all factors within a multidimensional construct. In doing so, parcels were tabulated by pairing Item 1 from the first factor with Item 1 from another factor, Item 2 from the first factor with Item 2 from another factor, and so on (Kishton & Widaman, 1994).⁴

Figure 1 presents the hypothesised structural model in Study 1, which resulted in good fit to the data, RMSEA = .041, 90% CI [0.000, 0.066], CFI = .99, TLI = .99 (see Hu & Bentler, 1999). As shown in Figure 1, national collective narcissism was a positive predictor of conspiratorial beliefs ($\beta = .29$, $SE = 0.08$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.137, 0.445]), in line with Hypothesis 1a and of humanitarian aid resistance ($\beta = .19$, $SE = 0.06$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [0.074, 0.308]), confirming Hypothesis 1b. Perceived strategic motives were also positively predicted by conspiratorial beliefs ($\beta = .54$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.420,

0.667)), whereas perceived prosocial motives were negatively predicted by conspiratorial beliefs ($\beta = -.18$, $SE = 0.08$, $p = .001$, 95% CI [-0.444, -0.115]), supporting Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Finally, perceived strategic motives were positively related to humanitarian aid resistance ($\beta = .49$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.369, 0.603]), whereas perceived prosocial motives were negatively related to humanitarian aid resistance ($\beta = -.21$, $SE = 0.07$, $p = .004$, 95% CI [-0.348, -0.065]). These results corroborated Hypotheses 3a and 3b.

To conclude, the findings from the first study support our hypotheses by showing that national collective narcissism positively predicted conspiratorial beliefs, and these beliefs were positively related to the perception of aid as a form of strategically motivated outgroup help. In turn, greater perceived strategic motives of outgroup helping were associated with more humanitarian aid resistance.

Study 2

The first aim of Study 2 was to provide a conceptual replication of Study 1, by focusing on intergroup conflict instead of national collective narcissism as a predictor of conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance. According to Esses et al. (1998), intergroup conflict denotes a competition that pits the ingroup against the outgroup over either tangible resources such as wealth, territory, and group power, or intangible resources such as social status and ideology. The competition that underlies intergroup conflict implies that the benefit of one group involves the loss of the other group (J. M. Levine & Hogg, 2010). When intergroup conflict escalates, the losing group's resources are diminished (Yokota & Nakanishi, 2017). Intergroup conflict thus contributes to a competitive mindset and is associated with negative views of the competing outgroup (Gaunt, 2011). We therefore argued that intergroup conflict would augment humanitarian aid recipients' beliefs that aid providers conspire to harm their group. As a consequence, they would be more prone to resist humanitarian aid offered by the threatening outgroup.

The second aim of Study 2 was to extend Study 1 by adding negative evaluations of humanitarian aid to the hypothesised model. We reasoned that people resist humanitarian aid that is perceived to be guided by strategic motives because they evaluate the aid negatively. That is, the aid is seen as either primarily benefitting the donor instead of the recipient (Fisher et al., 2008; Fisher et al., 1982) or as degrading the recipient's reputation as powerful, competent, or independent group (Carnegie & Dolan, 2015; Halabi & Nadler, 2010; Nelson, 2010; van Leeuwen, 2017; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010). Particularly in the case of intergroup conflict, groups wish to protect the reputation of their group as competent and powerful, and are found to be very reluctant to accept help from the competing outgroup. For example, Halabi et al. (2011) found that a less powerful group (i.e., Arab participants) refused help from a more powerful group member (i.e., the Jewish research assistant) because the help offer was perceived as threatening the recipient group's collective self-esteem. Moreover, van Leeuwen et al. (2011) observed that groups were less inclined to seek help from an outgroup with which they were in conflict, compared to a non-conflict outgroup, in spite of their apparent need for help. These notions, overall, suggest that the perceived motives of humanitarian aid have a consequential impact on negative evaluations of the aid, which ultimately evoke humanitarian aid resistance.

In their model of conspiracy mentality as generalised political attitude, Imhoff and Bruder (2014) argued that conspiracy theories are particularly attributed to high-power groups. Conspiracy theories are also characterised by ingroup members' perception that the conspirators have malevolent intentions, provoking antagonistic, hostile attitudes towards the conspirators (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Applying these insights to the context of the current research, it makes sense to argue that the more humanitarian aid recipients believe that the aid providers are conspiring against them, the more likely it is that they will negatively evaluate the help offer, which in turn would give rise to humanitarian aid resistance.

Unlike that of Study 1, the focus of Study 2 was not on past major natural disasters but on a more recent one, the 2018 Sulawesi earthquake and tsunami, which had just affected Indonesia when the study was conducted.

We hypothesised that intergroup conflict would increase participants' beliefs in developed countries' conspiracy (Hypothesis 4a), and also increase humanitarian aid resistance (Hypothesis 4b). We also hypothesised that conspiratorial beliefs would lead to resistance to humanitarian aid because of their role in increasing participants' negative evaluations of the offered aid (Hypothesis 5). These negative evaluations of humanitarian aid in turn were hypothesised to mediate the positive relationship between perceived strategic motives for helping and resistance to humanitarian aid (Hypothesis 6a), as well as the negative relationship between perceived prosocial motives and resistance to humanitarian aid (Hypothesis 6b).

1

Method

Participants and design. Participants were 345 undergraduate students (276 women, 122 men, seven participants did not specify their gender; $M_{age} = 19.39$, $SD_{age} = 1.54$).⁵ They were recruited from four universities in Indonesia: IAIN Pekalongan ($n = 91$), IAIN Pontianak ($n = 93$), UIN Banjarmasin ($n = 103$), and Brawijaya ($n = 58$). Participants took part voluntarily and were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: intergroup conflict ($n = 167$) or control ($n = 178$).

Procedure and measures. Study 2 was administered in a classroom setting, approximately 15 days after an earthquake and a tsunami stroke Donggala and Palu in Sulawesi, Indonesia, on September 28, 2018. The questionnaire commenced with informed consent, followed by information defining humanitarian aid for natural disasters, as well as the distinction between developed and developing countries. Participants then were presented with a brief description of natural disasters, along with a list of some developed countries that offered humanitarian aid to Indonesia.⁶

Perceived intergroup conflict was manipulated in the next part of the questionnaire. Following procedures developed by Esses et al. (1998) and Okota and Nakanishi (2017), and adapting them to the context of the current research, participants in the conflict condition were instructed to read an article ostensibly published in various online newspapers in Indonesia. The article first described how Indonesia suffers losses due to stiff competition with developed countries. The losses were described to have been on the rise for decades and further expected to increase in the future. Participants were then asked to summarise the content of the article to ensure that they had processed and understood it. In the control condition, the article was absent and participants were asked to write about their activities on a given day. This procedure was based on G. Levine and Parkinson's (1994) argument on how the control condition should lack any treatment of the independent variable. Applying this argument to the context of our work, the procedure was designed to keep the salience of intergroup conflict at a minimum. The subsequent questionnaire included manipulation checks and measures of the dependent variables.

Perceived intergroup conflict served as a manipulation check and was assessed with four items (e.g., "Relations between Indonesia and developed countries are not harmonious"; $\alpha = .81$) adapted from Gaunt (2011) and Riketta (2005). Conspiratorial beliefs ($\alpha = .93$), perceived intention to assert power or dominance ($\alpha = .91$), perceived intention to manage warmth impression ($\alpha = .93$), perceived intention to demonstrate competence ($\alpha = .93$), prosocial motives ($\alpha = .92$), and humanitarian aid resistance ($\alpha = .95$) were slightly modified from Study 1. This modification was done by changing the phrase "granted by" into "offered by." A scale of negative evaluations of humanitarian aid was developed by the authors and assessed with six items ($\alpha = .88$) constituting concepts of unfavourable outcomes (e.g., "Humanitarian aid for disasters in Palu and Donggala, Central Sulawesi, offered by developed countries will be more beneficial for these countries than for Indonesia itself") and group reputation threat (e.g.,

Table 2. Correlations among observed variables: Study 2.

Variables	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Intergroup conflict (control = 0, conflict = 1)	–	–	–	.33**	.16**	.09	.05	.04	–.09	.04	.25**
2. Perceived conflict (manipulation check)	2.57	0.76	–	–	.54**	.45**	.28**	.34**	–.14**	.50**	.43**
3. Conspiratorial beliefs	2.77	0.89		–	–	.60**	.50**	.53**	–.16**	.63**	.43**
4. Power or dominance	2.58	0.83			–	–	.54**	.64**	–.28**	.76**	.48**
5. Warmth	3.14	0.89				–	–	.73**	–.001	.53**	.31**
6. Competence	2.89	0.87					–	–	–.07	.61**	.36**
7. Prosocial motives (empathy)	3.37	0.85						–	–	–.27**	–.33**
8. Negative evaluations of humanitarian aid	2.64	0.74							–	–	.53**
9. Humanitarian aid resistance	2.37	0.87									–

Note. ** $p < .01$.

“Humanitarian aid for disasters in Palu and Donggala, Central Sulawesi, offered by developed countries undermines the dignity of Indonesian people”). Inspection of exploratory factor analysis with promax rotation revealed that the six items highly loaded (i.e., from .73 to .83) onto one factor, which accounted for 61.61% of the total variance. After self-reporting their age and gender, participants were debriefed and thanked.⁷

Results and Discussion


Descriptive statistics. As shown in Table 2, all variables in Study 2 except for perceived social motives for outgroup help were positively correlated with humanitarian aid resistance.

Manipulation check. Participants in the intergroup conflict condition more strongly perceived that Indonesia was in conflict with developed countries ($M = 2.84$, $SD = 0.71$) than participants in the control condition ($M = 2.33$, $SD = 0.73$), $t(343) = 6.56$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.71$.⁸ This confirms the effectiveness of the intergroup conflict manipulation.

Hypothesis testing. Latent constructs in the hypothesised structural model in Study 2 were derived from item parcelling techniques identical to Study 1. The exception was made for intergroup conflict that was retained as an observed variable.

As shown in Figure 2, the structural model fitted well with the data, $RMSEA = .047$, 90% CI [0.03, 0.06], $CFI = .99$, $TLI = .99$. Intergroup conflict significantly increased both conspiratorial beliefs ($\beta = .16$, $SE = 0.05$, $p = .003$, 95% CI [0.05, 0.26]) and humanitarian aid resistance ($\beta = .21$, $SE = 0.05$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.12, 0.30]), supporting Hypotheses 4a and 4b. Conspiratorial beliefs positively predicted negative evaluations of humanitarian aid ($\beta = .27$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.16, 0.38]), and these negative evaluations in turn were positively related to humanitarian aid resistance ($\beta = .43$, $SE = 0.10$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.24, 0.62]). In support of Hypothesis 5, negative evaluations of humanitarian aid significantly mediated the positive relationship between conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance (indirect effect: $\beta = .12$, $SE = 0.04$, $p = .002$, 95% CI [0.04, 0.19]). We also found that negative evaluations of humanitarian aid significantly mediated the positive association between perceived strategic motives for outgroup help and humanitarian aid resistance (indirect effect: $\beta = .25$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [0.13, 0.37]), and the negative association between perceived prosocial motives for outgroup help and humanitarian aid resistance (indirect effect: $\beta = -.08$, $SE = 0.02$, $p < .001$, 95% CI [–0.12, –0.04]). These findings supported Hypotheses 6a and 6b.⁹

Figure 2. Results of the hypothesised model in Study 2.



Note. Numbers in the model are standardised path coefficients. All variables within the model were analysed in terms of their latent scores except for intergroup conflict that was retained as an observed variable. *ns* = nonsignificant. **p* < .05. ***p* < .01. ****p* < .001.

In conclusion, the findings from Study 2 conceptually replicate those from Study 1 by demonstrating that, similar to collective narcissism, perceived intergroup conflict increased conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance. They also showed that, as predicted, negative evaluations of humanitarian aid mediated the impact of perceived strategic and prosocial motives for outgroup help on aid resistance. This observation is noteworthy because helping in general is regarded as an act of kindness (van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2010), and humanitarian aid in particular is purported to be unconditional (Smirl, 2015). Yet when seen to be tied to the providers' strategic expectations, humanitarian aid threatens the recipients' group reputation, resulting in resistance to the offered aid. These findings are in line with the basic tenet of defensive helping (Nadler et al., 2009), and show how people are reluctant to receive help from another group when they feel that their group identity or reputation is at stake.

General Discussion

Applying insights from outgroup helping literature (e.g., van Leeuwen, 2017; Zagefka & James, 2015) to an underrepresented, Indonesian sample, we found that collective narcissism (Study 1) and intergroup conflict (Study 2) both increased

participants' beliefs in developed countries' conspiracies, which resulted in greater resistance to the humanitarian aid they offered. These findings confirmed our expectations. Results from the two studies also showed that people who perceived that developed countries were conspiring against them, more strongly believed that the humanitarian aid offered by these countries was done so with ulterior, strategic motives. As a consequence, resistance to humanitarian aid increased. In contrast, conspiratorial beliefs were a negative predictor of perceived prosocial motives for the humanitarian aid. That is, Indonesians who believed that developed countries were conspiring against Indonesia were less inclined to see the offered help as a reflection of a genuine desire to help disaster victims, and, because of that, were more likely to resist help. Moreover, conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance were positively predicted by the individual factor of national collective narcissism (Study 1) as well as by the situational factor of intergroup conflict (Study 2).

Theoretical Implications

This paper is the first to investigate how perceived strategic and prosocial motives for outgroup help affect resistance to humanitarian aid.

Previous literature has provided useful insights into different motives for helping others, be they strategic or prosocial, within the context of intergroup helping in general (for a review, see van Leeuwen, 2017) or humanitarian aid in particular (for a review, see Zagefka & James, 2015). However, there has been no empirical research examining how perceptions of strategic or prosocial motives affect help acceptance or help resistance. Filling this gap, we focused on the perspective of humanitarian aid recipients. Our findings are in line with the arguments of the strategic OUTgroup helping (SOUTH) model (van Leeuwen, 2017). This model posits that strategic outgroup helping provokes help resistance because recipients may view it as a type of help that fulfils the providers' needs (e.g., asserting group power and competence) at the expense of their own needs (e.g., maintaining respect and autonomy). This misalignment makes recipients feel that strategic outgroup help undermines their psychological needs, and resisting said help is a way to fend off the threat.

Our findings are also in line with the adaptive-conspiracism hypothesis (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018), which suggests that conspiracies by powerful outgroups threaten the ingroup, which drives people to avoid these suspected outgroups. Consistent with these ideas, both studies reported in this paper revealed that increased conspiratorial beliefs coincided with an increased perception that the offered humanitarian aid was undermining the ingroup's reputation, which ultimately contributed to aid resistance.

Collective narcissism reflects individuals' beliefs that the superiority of their group is underappreciated by other groups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). This perceived lack of external validation of the ingroup's superior position gives rise to unfavourable attitudes and intentions towards the outgroup, and results in the belief that the outgroup harbours harmful intentions against the ingroup (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). In line with this notion, we found that collective narcissism triggered recipients' conspiracy theories and generated resistance to the offered aid. What matters here is that humanitarian aid has

little chance of being welcomed when recipients consider the providers of aid as their enemy (Byman et al., 2000; Solomon & Hsu, 2007). Another factor that contributes to the perception of the provider of help as the enemy is the degree to which the provider is seen to be in conflict with the ingroup. We found that such intergroup conflict increased conspiratorial thinking and humanitarian aid resistance. Taken together, these findings may provide a better understanding of the dynamics of humanitarian aid relations, suggesting how people's negative views of, and resistance to, aid are rooted at either the individual factor of collective narcissism, or at the situational factor of intergroup conflict.

The present work examined how national collective narcissism (Study 1) or existing intergroup conflict (Study 2) led to the perception of humanitarian aid offers as driven by strategic motives. However, not all intergroup helping is grounded in strategic motives (van Leeuwen, 2017). More often than not, humanitarian aid is rooted in genuinely benign intentions, even if recipients view it otherwise. Such benign intentions may reflect concern about the recipient's well-being, or a desire for fairness (Anaya-Arenas et al., 2018). Humanitarian aid may also be driven by donors' awareness of the victims' needs (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011), as well as compassion reflecting people's tendency to care for and help disaster victims (Zagefka et al., 2013).

Regardless of the donor's motives for providing humanitarian aid, the focus of the current research was on recipients' interpretations of this aid. Across two studies, we found that perceived intention to manage warmth impression, along with perceived intention to demonstrate dominance or competence, was positively related to negative evaluations of humanitarian aid and to resistance to it. That is, the warmer the donating group was seen to be, the more negatively its aid was evaluated. This finding may appear to counter impression management literature that shows that, through helping another group, ingroup members tend to communicate their warmth and kindness (Hopkins et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Täuber, 2012). Indeed, prior research showed that

help offerers are seen as warmer and kinder than help recipients or third parties (Täuber & van Leeuwen, 2017), suggesting that the act of helping is indeed an effective tool to establish a warm ingroup impression. The crucial factor, however, may lie in the degree to which recipients are aware of the helper's motivation to promote a positive ingroup reputation, and to use the provision of humanitarian aid to that end. The measure of perceived warmth in our studies did not reflect a genuinely warm trait, but a strategic and somewhat hypocritical act to misrepresent humanitarian aid as a reflection of kindness and concern, when in reality the aid was driven by self-serving reputational motives. Through the lens of aid recipients, appearing warm in this context only affirms the ulterior motive of the developed countries in providing humanitarian aid. As such, it makes perfect sense that, in this research, perceived intention to appear warm was associated with more negative appraisals of the aid, and with more aid resistance.

In this research, we treated warmth impression, asserting dominance or power, and demonstrating competence as a single latent construct reflecting perceived strategic motives for outgroup helping. We reasoned that our focal interest is not in the uniqueness but in the commonality of the three motives. Framed in this light, each of the strategic motives similarly taps into recipients' perceptions that the humanitarian aid offered to them is beneficial not only for themselves but also, more particularly, for the providers (van Leeuwen, 2017). In both Study 1 (see Figure 1) and Study 2 (see Figure 3 in Appendix E of the supplemental material), perceived strategic motives positively predicted humanitarian aid resistance. However, additional analyses showed that when the three strategic motives were analysed separately within a single structural model in Study 1 (see Figure 4 in Appendix F of the supplemental material) and Study 2 (see Figure 6 in Appendix F of the supplemental material), perceived intention to assert dominance or power was a better predictor of humanitarian aid resistance than perceived warmth impression and perceived intention to demonstrate competence.¹⁰ These findings are in line with existing literature

(e.g., Shnabel et al., 2009; Siem et al., 2013) positing that members of low-status groups are more interested in their ingroup being seen as powerful than members of high-status groups are interested in their ingroup being seen as sociable or warm. Perceiving humanitarian aid from a developed country as guided by the motive of asserting power or dominance arguably threatens the recipient's need to be a powerful agent. This perception may render humanitarian aid offers harmful in the recipients' view, and foster resistance to aid (van Leeuwen, 2017).

Limitations and Directions for Future Research

Beliefs in conspiracies not only affect responses to societal crises such as war and terrorism, but also responses to positive events with benevolent goals (e.g., giving presents in a party; see van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). Recipients of humanitarian aid offers can thus be suspicious of the helpers' intentions. Although humanitarian aid is often unconditional, recipients can still view it as being tied to the providers' specific expectations, which may be harmful to the recipients' own group (Smirl, 2015). A case in point is the humanitarian aid offered to Venezuela in 2018 and 2019. Despite the country's shortage of food and medicine, the government of President Maduro continues to reject aid offered by the US and its presumed allies (Pozzebon, 2019). This kind of positive event-related conspiracy theories can be assessed in future studies, to look at their role in eliciting outgroup help resistance.

Future research could also look at the degree to which help recipients view their status relations with the help providers as insecure (i.e., unstable and illegitimate). Resistance to aid that is believed to be motivated by strategic goals should be stronger when status relations are insecure (van Leeuwen, 2017). Future studies can assess both the perceived stability (i.e., the extent to which participants feel that their nation can challenge the hierarchical position of developed countries) and the perceived legitimacy (i.e., how much participants feel that the advantageous position of the developed countries

relative to their nation is unfair) of status relations.

In this research, we derived the hypothesised models across two studies from theory-driven arguments. However, competing explanations beyond the hypothesised models remain possible, which may be tackled in future research. For example, as described in the anecdote put forward in the general introduction, Indonesians responded with antagonism when the Australian prime minister attempted to appeal to feelings of indebtedness that Indonesians should have as a result of having received humanitarian aid from Australia a decade before (Hurst, 2015). Antagonistic reactions such as these may give rise to aid recipients' collective narcissism, and a perception that their relationship with the donor is conflictual. This perception of conflict, in turn, could breed conspiratorial beliefs. The model presented in the current paper may thus have a reciprocal element to it, with conspiratorial beliefs as both cause and consequence of conflict perceptions. This notion could be examined in future research.

Another potential limitation has to do with the fact that we construed Study 2 as a conceptual replication of Study 1, by arguing that intergroup conflict is a phenomenon closely related to collective narcissism. Greater collective narcissism is assumed to be associated with greater perceptions of intergroup conflict. This assumption, however, was not empirically tested in the present research. Future studies may therefore assess both collective narcissism and intergroup conflict, and examine how these constructs relate to each other as well as their unique contributions in predicting conspiratorial beliefs and humanitarian aid resistance.

A final limitation involves the fact that the constructs or variables in the present research were mostly self-developed and specific to the Indonesian context. This kind of measurement and research context may raise the question of how much the current empirical findings can generalise to other contexts. Future studies hence are needed to test the reliability and dimensionality of, as well as interrelationships among, the studied constructs in the context of humanitarian aid resistance outside Indonesia.

Practical Implications

Less powerful groups are susceptible to believe in malignant conspiracies of more powerful groups against them, because they experience a chronic lack of control (van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018). It is therefore important to find ways to enhance less powerful groups' sense of control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015). One promising strategy is to provide humanitarian aid as autonomy-oriented help, that is, a type of help that gives a partial instead of full solution to the problem (Nadler & Halabi, 2006). Autonomy-oriented help fosters recipients' sense of competence and empowerment (Alvarez & van Leeuwen, 2011). Natural disaster aid that takes the shape of autonomy-oriented help may thus reduce recipients' conspiratorial beliefs and, ultimately, their resistance to the aid being offered.

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Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. Item wording of all scales in Studies 1 and 2 is presented in Appendix A of the supplemental material.
2. Correlations among latent variables in Studies 1 and 2 are presented in Appendix B of the supplemental material.
3. Using Mplus Version 7.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2015), we found that the data did not meet the assumption of multivariate normality in both Study 1 (skewness = 14.28, $M = 7.20$, $SD = 0.67$, $p < .001$; kurtosis = 175.45, $M = 141.75$, $SD = 2.05$, $p < .001$) and Study 2 (skewness = 14.74, $M = 4.89$, $SD = 0.43$, $p < .001$; kurtosis = 190.82, $M = 142.18$, $SD = 1.63$, $p < .001$).
4. Details of item parcelling in Study 1 are presented in Appendix C of the supplemental material, whereas

those of item parcelling in Study 2 are presented in Appendix D of the supplemental material.

5. Ten participants were excluded from the analysis due to their noncompliance with the instructions in the intergroup condition or the control condition.
6. When Study 2 was conducted, there were no official reports on the developed countries that had already granted humanitarian aid for disasters in Central Sulawesi. However, the media released the names of 14 developed countries, such as the US and Japan, which were listed in the questionnaire of Study 2 as countries that offered aid.
7. We also assessed perceived injustice (five items; $\alpha = .85$) and negative intergroup emotions (eight items; $\alpha = .91$) after the experimental manipulation. Data are available upon request.
8. Effect size in this analysis was calculated using G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007).
9. A brief discussion to examine how much the findings of Study 2 were consistent with those of Study 1 is presented in Appendix E of the supplemental material.
10. In Appendix F of the supplemental material, the single latent construct of perceived strategic motives for outgroup helping was broken down into its facets (i.e., perceived intention to assert power or dominance, perceived intention to manage warmth impression, and perceived intention to demonstrate competence) and specified as Alternative Model 1 (Study 1), Alternative Model 2, and Alternative Model 3 (Study 2). Each of the three facets was analysed as a latent construct based on item parcelling (presented in Appendices G and H of the supplemental material). As can be seen in Appendix F of the supplemental material, we found that the hypothesised structural model in Study 1 was more parsimonious or efficient in explaining the data than its corresponding Alternative Model 1, so were the hypothesised structural model in Study 2 than its corresponding Alternative Model 2 (see Figure 5 in Appendix F of the supplemental material), and Study 1's conceptual replication model in Study 2 as compared with its Alternative Model 3.

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