

Women For Sale: Arranged Marriages Through *Jujuran* In The Traditions Of Society In Indonesia

Catatan:

1. 1. Sudah lebih jelas dan terarah;
2. 2. Paparan masih ada yang tumpang tindih;
3. 3. Bahasa perlu dilihat lagi dengan seksama;
4. 4. Outline atau penyusunan sub-bab dan redaksi perlu dilihat lagi:
5. 5. Outline (tawaran)

1. 1. Introduction
2. 2. Marital contentment and….
3. 3. Mahar and jujuran: Islamic and local values in Banjar
4. 4. Deliberation on marriages and the remaining practice of Jujuran:
    a. a. empowering women's right to marital economy
    b. b. curbing women's right to choice in Failure of agreed payment by Groom
c. 5. Concluding Remarks

Marriage Agreement: Arranged Marriages tThrough *Jujuran* In Banjar Community
or
Deliberating Marriage Payment through 'Jujuran' within banjarese Community

Abstract: In the Banjarese culture, when they are going to have a marriage, besides a dowry, *jujuran* is also given, which is a request from the woman's family for a certain amount of money. Although much research had discussed dowry, there was no research on *jujuran* as a sign of marriage. This study was conducted with a phenomenological approach as part of a qualitative approach. The researchers tried to understand and describe a phenomenon about the subjects' experiences regarding the marriage system in the Banjar community, South Kalimantan, Indonesia. The results of the research proved that the Banjarese used jujuran as a sign of marriage agreement. Although the aim of *jujuran* was to improve the economic standard after the marriage, this system determined who had the right to propose to their daughters. The facts proved that this tradition was considered to violate the rights of the women in determining their choice when the men were unable to pay the *jujuran*.
Keywords: women, matchmaking,??? *jujuran*, marriage, local valuetradition

Abstrak: Dalam budaya masyarakat Banjar, ketika akan melakukan pernikahan, selain mahar diberikan pula *jujuran*, yaitu permintaan sejumlah uang dari keluarga pihak perempuan. Meski banyak peneliti yang membahas mahar, namun belum ada yang mengungkap realitas pemberian *jujuran* sebagai tanda jadi perkawinan. kajian ini dilakukan dengan pendekatan fenomenologi yang merupakan bagian dari pendekatan kualitatif, di mana peneliti berupaya untuk memahami dan mendeskripikan sebuah fenomena tentang apa yang dialami oleh subjek penelitian,yakni mengenai sistem perkawinan pada masyarakat Banjar, Kalimantan Selatan, Indonesia. Hasil penelitian membuktikan bahwa tradisi masyarakat Banjar masih menggunakan jujuran atau pemberian uang dari laki-laki kepada keluarga perempuan sebagai tanda diterima lamarannya. Walaupun *jujuran* adalah untuk meningkatkan taraf perekonomian anak-anak mereka ketika sudah menikah, faktanya sistem ini menentukan siapa yang berhak melamar anak perempuan mereka. Fakta membuktikan bahwa tradisi ini dianggap melanggar hak-hak perempuan dalam menentukan pilihannya, dan laki-laki ketika tidak mampu membayar *jujuran* tersebut.
Kata Kunci: perempuan, perjodohan, jujuran, pernikahan, tradisi

INTRODUCTION

At this time, almost the whole world has begun to be interested in a marriage system that is traditionally regulated, such as in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East,

and some other Muslim countries. According to the cause is a large number of migration practices so that this practice has spread today to countries of the western world. Many families choose their husbands and daughters based on wealth, thus turning the woman into a tradeable item.

Of course, in practice, the marriage system with this trading model has been conflicted by women, especially if the matchmaking practice is promised in exchange for a high dowry. A woman's family tends to find the best candidate for her child, especially when it comes to wealth. This pattern seems to have become a habit in the 20th century because it is considered promising for their children's future , especially if they have a high education to a degree.

Menon has researched India, and the findings prove a relationship between a woman's income and wealth and domestic violence. One of the factors that can influence domestic violence is the dowry that a woman receives at marriage. Because gifts such as gold when getting married can endogenously affect the quality of a partner's match, the results showed a positive and significant effect of giving a very high dowry at marriage on domestic violence . This pattern shows, in general, that women are abused by giving enormous amounts to improve the family economy later. It is inversely proportional; his research states that this causes husbands to easily abuse their wives because they are considered flawed or unable. It is among the causes of their domestic violence.

Based on their research on women's choice when arranged marriage, the findings show that women who are to be married off are mostly voluntary between parents, even without their children's knowledge. Second, the system of determining money as nominal in marriage is determined based on the amount of money to determine which marriage proposal will be accepted. Third, matchmaking with a marriage proposal seems to offer their child to marry only those who have immense wealth and money in giving as a sign of marriage.

As is the case in the tradition of community marriage in Indonesia, which mostly follows Islam, dowry is an obligatory part that must be done by the husband to his wife . However, the dowry is not burdensome because by the advice of the Qur'an Surah An-Nisa verse 4, Meaning: Give dowry (mehr) to the woman (whom you marry) as a voluntary gift. Then if they give you a portion of the dowry with pleasure, eat (take) the gift (as food), which is delicious again with good results ".

The primary purpose of this obligation to give dowry is to show the sincerity of the husband's intention to marry his wife and to place him in a noble degree. By obliging this dowry, Islam shows that women are creatures that deserve respect and have the right to own property. Likewise, the rules of the Hadith of the Prophet SAW,

انْظُرْ وَلَوْ خَاتَماِ مِنْ حَدِيْد

Meaning: "*Look for even if it is only an iron ring.*" (Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim).

The Shari'a does not determine the amount of the dowry. Dowries may be of low value and may be of high value as long as they are mutually pleased. An-Nawawi explained,

في هذا الحديث أنه يجوز أن يكون الصداق, لأن خاتم الحديد في نهاية من القلة, وهذا مذهب الشافعي وهو مذهب جماهير العلماء من

means: "This hadith shows that the dowry was allowed a little (low value) and maybe a lot (high value) if both partners are happy with each other, because the iron ring shows a cheap dowry value. This is the opinion in the Shafi'i school and also the opinion of the scholars of *salaf* and *khalaf*. " (Syarh Sahih Muslim 9/190).

Perlu ada paragraph atau kalimat penghubung di sini…!!

There have been a number of research on the issue of dowry and arrangement of mariage….

Kalwant Bhopal studied the phenomenon of dowry in Britain as a contribution to South Asian women's patriarchal oppression in the household. The research on which this

study is based examines the intersection of gender and ethnicity with particular reference to South Asian women in the UK. The findings show that dowries were used to sell women as property in matchmaking. Education and religion made a significant difference in women's responses to dowries. Highly educated women can live together with their partners or be single and say dowries are degrading. Women with lower education levels say the dowry is part of the traditions, customs, and identities of the South Asian people; these women are mated and given a dowry. When South Asian women became highly educated, they rejected matchmaking and the practice of dowry (private patriarchy) and entered the labor market (into public patriarchy).

Marriage is a daunting institution. Despite a strong start, many couples are not content with their marital partnership. In a study carried out in Iran, it was recorded that during the first year of marriage, 15 percent of registered divorces occur. Meanwhile, in the fifth year of marriage, 53 percent of divorce cases arise. INI BAGIAN APA DAN MAKSUDNYA APA>.. DIBUAT NARASI YANG SALING MENGHUBUNGKAN…

Religion in Malaysia is the primary motive of marriage in Jamiah 's study. With the defense of human dignity from desire and evil, marriage empowers the spiritual dimension. To fulfill biological and psychological needs by meeting human nature's condition to live together in a stable family, marriage is also essential. Thus, in Malay culture, marriage institutions are still common and seen as a new life stage, a happy relationship, and religious achievement.

Today, despite the high number of divorce rates and constant marriage problems, many people want to get married. Indeed, many couples live happily in the marriage relationship as well. In a stable relationship, they share the same factors: confidence, engagement, consultation with each other, personal relationship, problem-solving together, collaboration in the education of children, sharing shared values, and expressing their love

for each other. In terms of economics, if their anticipated marriage benefits fall short of their anticipated usefulness outside of the current marriage, individuals divorce, and children reflect a marriage-specific form of investment that typically increases marriage benefits for the spouses. However, children can also threaten marital stability because they will provoke drastic changes in the allocation of money and time to the household.

Researchers??? Who??? Authors of this paper??? differ from previous researchers by assuming that dowries are sometimes considered part of women's sales . Even if you look at the traditions in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has a different tradition that also uses little money , namely the giving of *jujuran*. Unlike the dowry, the determination of *jujuran* in the Banjar tradition in Indonesia is determined at the outset as part of the marriage plan's approval or rejection (proposal) . This research will ask about the idea of jujuran in the Banjar community of South Kalimantan against the marriage system since there is an inference that the demand for nominal money is considered to be the sale of his daughter's evidence of marriage acceptance in order to boost the economy of the family. This makes this research interesting that women are considered whether they are used as the merchandise?? that can be sold according to the rate set by their parents or women to be honored.

METHODS DIGABUNG KE INTRO SAJA>>>>>>

The method used in this research was qualitative with a phenomenological approach by looking at the various activities and marriage systems in the Banjar tradition, Indonesia . Researchers conducted data reduction and data triangulation to carefully and carefully represent the actual phenomenon.The sample in this study was 20 women and 20 men aged between 19 to 25 years and lived in Eastern Indonesia. The subjects were chosen because the Banjarese tend to use traditional, religious, and state approaches to implement their marriages. Information was collected using semi-structured interviews until the data

was complete. Written interviews were also carried out online because there is still a Covid-19 outbreak in Indonesia in the current conditions.

Participation was voluntary, and the participants who met the requirements for inclusion received informed consent. The following large data-Participants replied in complete detail, requiring very few subsequent probes or clarifiers. The interviews were conducted with a review of the data simultaneously. After data saturation, each interview was coded, and the process proceeded until no other results were obtained. To recognize common themes, the researchers read through all the transcribed data

Theories of Marital Contentment aAnd Equity

The global measurement of a person's marital partnership applies to marital satisfaction. The concept of marital satisfaction refers to the subjective evaluation of a person's particular component. Garcia (1999) says that happiness is perceived on three levels: a) a partner's happiness, b) a family's satisfaction, c) a general lifelong satisfaction. In marriage security, marital satisfaction plays a significant role. Some researchers have been interested in the relationship between a) prosperity and marital fulfillment and b) equity and marital enjoyment. *Jujuran* and dowry's most significant and complicated aspects.

Wong and Goodwin (2009) found that continued relationship and co-operation, marriage support, and financial stability in the family in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, and China are the main factors in marital satisfaction. However, very few studies have centered on the nuances of how societies are affected by marital satisfaction perceptions and experiences. The cultural values influence the ideas and opinions of the person about himself.

The theory of equity focuses on equity gains and contributions balance. Equity could not be worth everyone reasonably. Mckenzie (2003) indicates that inequity has a lower degree of satisfaction in close relationships. When ties are unequitable, people feel

themselves under-benefited or over-profited. Under-benefited inequity exists if people receive fewer benefits compared to their parents than contributions.

However, if individuals receive more profit than their wives due to contributions, there are extreme inequities. Many studies indicate that women are less vulnerable than men. Under the theory of justice, people should be comfortable with unequal marriages, and people should be distressed in unfair marriages, and with the extent of injustice, suffering increases. Pillemer et al. (2008) analyzed and found (85 percent) that their marriages have been fair and equal for the satisfaction of older women's marriages in the USA. Likewise, the nurturing theory involves disparities in a socially-cultural building that lead to different roles and tasks between men and women. The gap always puts women's roles and contributions in personal, social, national, and state lives behind them and overlooks them. Women who get married because of arranged marriages in Indonesia do like this too.

Arranged Marriage: Parent's Negotiation to Empower Women for "Sale" (SUB BAB INI BEDANYA DENGAN SUB BAB BAWAH???

Matchmaking for money causes an understanding that the family arranges the marriage of their daughter and is trafficked to improve the family's economic situation . Based on the data obtained, *jujuran* and dowry are part of the tradition and Islamic religious affairs. The dowry that is asked for is mostly not too high. At the same time, *jujuran* is enforced to ask for the prospective husband's eligibility to increase the economic level of a woman's family.

Based on the results of research conducted on informants online, it was found that the motivation for marriage based on the choice of parents had different concepts based on classifications based on parental demand, will of heart and self, education, and economic

needs. Although in the end the matchmaking was not known in the future, whether it would be survive or end in divorce.

This is by the quote from the interview, which states:

"I chose yes, even though there was no love in the wedding plan" (Informant 1) "

"It is up to the parents, and the important thing is to be happy, sob .. "(Informant 2)

" It is better to marry at the request of their parents than to choose the wrong choice, and in the end divorce."(Informant 3)

Parents' concerns about adolescence at the age of 19-25 are sometimes considered vulnerable and are always curious about various problems, especially romance. Until in the end, if it is directed at the right thing, they are grateful. However, if the information comes, especially nowadays, the online era is worried that they will fall into free sex. Of course, this will result in sexual activity before mental and spiritual maturity is reached. The choice of parents and family is one of the roles in solving these problems, as quoted from the interview:

"family support will also be part of a matchmaking marriage later" (informant 4)

"Factors due to family suggestions and requests are part of finding a marriage partner who does not exist. until now "(informant 5)

" economic factors are an essential part of this marriage, especially if the dowry requested with a high value is approved "(informant)

" The important thing is that the candidate is wealthy, then my future will be bright "(informant)

" yes, maybe because the father and mother support so that there is no dating "(Informant)

" The factor is due to parents' suggestions, and they are afraid of people's inadequate responses to be prospective brides. "(Informant)

Most of the time, choice based on education is part of the appropriate choice if you marry young or are arranged in marriage at a young age. It is also an encouragement for women to marry according to their parents' choices based on circumstances. The following is an excerpt from the interview:

"Getting married is based on needs according to their education, so follow what the parents say ..."

"When I am in college, if someone wants me through my parents, I will look at the prospective bride's education. The man used to be…. At least have a bachelor's degree or have a permanent job."

"… I got married because my parents arranged marriage, based on my family opinion and I just followed "(Informant)

In Indonesian society, marriage is based on parents and family's choice like them, has become a habit of some people. It is evidenced by several researchers who have seen that many are married because they are matchmaking on average when they finish high school (SMA) and have no work to do. However, if they continue their undergraduate education, the motivation in marriage and matchmaking is also different.

The culture of getting married at an early age based on matchmaking has long been a part of the tradition in Indonesia. Most of them do not continue their education to the bachelor's level and do not have jobs done as regular income.??? Data??Based on the percentage regarding the policy of parents getting married because of matchmaking, nearly 80% of those who are currently in the undergraduate study does not approve of getting married at a young age and have not yet finished college. For 10%, some of them agree that there are men who are considered stable in their economy. It is because it is the parents' best choice and makes these choices useful for their families later.

The most choices in finding a partner based on matchmaking have a robust Islamic religion. Simultaneously, if there is a choice between economics and education, most informants answered that 80% chose men with a stable and robust economy, while 20% considered education necessary, but work is even more critical. The dowry that was given later, whether they agreed with the high dowry or not, almost 70% did not agree that marriage among teenagers, especially those with undergraduate education with a high dowry. It is considered to make it difficult for women to find their future husbands. Meanwhile, 30% agree that they are pleased to have a serious and high-income husband with a high dowry during the matchmaking.

Agreements made between parents without their knowledge when matchmaking also differed, as 80% of the matchmaking had to be known by the woman. In comparison, 20% followed the parents' choice, as long as the goal is good and gives happiness in the household later. It indicates that social norms control girls' behavior and obey what their parents ask for, based on the evidence from these interviews. This standard suggests that girls would marry according to their parents' preference based on better economic requirements. This motive is used to justify matchmaking marriages if the parents' choice is still pleasant. Although it is often believed that, based on a large dowry or integrity, the woman was sold. In general, studying would follow the marriage matchmaking scheme since there are no other choices. There are only a few pieces of girls that are harmful to them who practice "transformative" agency toward social norms. The primary aim of marriage is spiritual encouragement, and when the couple establishes a legal partnership, marriage is assumed to lead to perfection. When the male candidate is wealthy, most respondents follow this method of "forced" marriage.

Based on research results, 85% of women who are ready to get married agree with *jujuran* to determine a marriage match. 10% disagreed with the assumption that *adjudication* was like buying a woman and was considered burdensome to the prospective husband if it was too high. On the other hand, men also thought that 70% agreed to give money to a woman's family as a basis for agreeing to propose to her child later. 20% of men do not agree with *jujuran* because it is considered burdensome and as if it is bargaining for girls.

Nearly 90% of women are also against forced marriage on the assumption that it is for the girl's good and agree on her choice and her family. Meanwhile, 60% of men agreed to the marriage based on their parents' choice and were forced to marry their choice. While 20% do not agree if the parents only approve the woman's marriage, there is a mutual agreement between the family and the prospective bride.

When the bride and groom are still women or virgins, of course, researchers strongly oppose the forced marriage. The women interviewed opposed this marriage for reasons of religion, love, and women's rights. In contrast to men, some opinions still agree because the right to marry a woman lies with her parents or father.

According to researchers, giving money to carry out this tradition is considered capable of influencing women's welfare and the distribution of wealth in their families. Although sometimes they are still considered selling their daughters. However, the prevalence and amount of *jujuran* payments vary from region to region, depending on economic conditions, community structure, institutions, and family characteristics. Payments to propose to girls have also developed in Banjar society and over time. However, there is a shift in women who are already widows (married and then divorced). It all depends on the mindset and understanding of the Banjar community and others in understanding the meaning of *jujuran* or giving money based on the woman's family's request.

However, the researchers saw that women were more sensitive to matchmaking based on little money, which was received if slightly rejected if high. Most women also expressed disagreement with pre-marriage bargaining practices because it was considered to violate rights and sometimes endangered disharmony in the household.

Jujuran: a Gender Equality Approach From Father

In East Indonesia, especially in the Banjar community of South Kalimantan province, the practice of marriage is inseparable from the role of tradition that has been carried out from generation to generation . This tradition makes it seem as if it is mandatory to carry out weddings between Banjar tribes or with other tribes . Because it has become a custom, the practice of giving or determining a nominal value when proposing to his daughter is also an obligation. A motivation to marry is provided by economies of scale

associated with living as a couple rather than in two separate households; problems with free-riding in collective household goods can lead to divorce. The most likely to be stable are relationships involving spouses, whose preferences or productivity are identical, where private goods are shared equally. In comparison, marriages involving very different partners and an unequal share of market labor among their partners are much shorter and will end in divorce.

Based on the data found, the concept of *jujuran* is the giving of an amount of money given by the male family to the woman's family to be married . Interestingly, this gift has been agreed upon by the two families who have bargained the *jujuran* price for the woman who will marry later. Although at first, it was assumed to be for consumption purposes for weddings or household furniture later. This tradition is indeed fascinating to study because, in practice, parents use their daughters to accept or reject other people's proposals . If it is considered too cheap or unsuitable, the woman's family can look for someone else who wants her daughter. The amount of *jujuran* value also depends on several things. Like the bride's background, a woman's appearance, or indeed a pure agreement between the two brides.

Jujuran is different from dowry, where dowry is mentioned in the consent *qabul,* while *jujuran* itself is not mentioned. *Jujuran* is not entirely the bride's property because *jujuran* money is used to finance the wedding party and can also be used by the bride's parents to buy the woman's needs and as initial capital for a family. Until now, this obligation to give has drawn the pros and cons of this system because this system is more like buying women or just giving, ultimately became the cause of divorce.

Of course, the effect is sometimes burdensome for men if the money requested is considerable, even though this tradition is not recommended from the Islamic side. It could even be considered a subtle refusal so that the men would not be offended by the high demand for money. This effect is stated by some opinions only to ensure the seriousness

of the prospective groom to his daughter, who is getting married to be economically secure for some time.

CONCLUSION

Dowry and *jujuran* are gifts given by the male family to female candidates, which has changed according to the times. Dowry is a part that must be carried out during the marriage contract, while *jujuran* is given to pre-marriage as a sign of acceptance and acceptance from the woman's family. The nominal value of *jujuran* depends on the bride; the higher the education and beauty, the higher the value of *jujuran* money based on the understanding of the traditions in the Banjar community. The purpose of determining *jujuran* is to emphasize a man's seriousness when proposing to his daughter, not to be sold or made into a transaction. The biological motivation for marriage involves fulfilled human status, couples, and children's human patrimony continuity. Mutual love, friendship, and pleasure are, meanwhile, the primary socio-psychological factors for marriage.

The primary purpose of marriage is spiritual motivation. When the couple enters into a legal relationship, the marriage is thought to lead to perfection, even if it is coercing the daughter. In reality, this research has limitations, i.e., the assumption that parents push their children based on their culture or religion. Due to the limited amount of time in this analysis, researchers can not address this issue. It is because it has been recognized in Islamic law as the right to marriage consent.

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If this article aims to be published, huge revision will be needed. The following notes should be noticed.
Remarks:

1. 1. The topic is interesting and can be considered for publication after quite significant or major revisions
2. 2. The discussion of this article is too short compared to the introduction/
3. 3. The length of the paper: the paper is too short and does not meet the requirement of the length specified by the journal; the number of words;.
4. 4. This article provides no novelty and its scope is not clear: (1) in many ways, abundant we found articles that allude *jujuran* as object of study by many scholars; (2) in the title of this article said "in Indonesia", but the in following explanation merely mentioned Banjar community.
5. 5. The data shown in this article is not sufficient and also cannot be claimed under the phenomenological approach or in the glasses of ethnographic study at all. The method of this study is absurd. The results are not properly concluded.
6. 6. The structure of the paper: method and discussion need to be reviewed
7. 7. The analysis deployed: quantitative? It is etnographic research?? Reconsider! The data must be sound with ethnographic narratives;
8. 8. Judul perlu dipertimbangkan lagi. Barangkali bisa memilih judul yang lebih tepat.
9. 9. The technical errors must be revised; the putting of numbers of the references!
10. 10. This article contains many grammatical mistakes, unclear sentences and incoherent statements.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to reveal whether the tradition of marriage in Indonesia by giving money is like selling girls. In Indonesia, in general, the giving of a dowry/mehr when getting married. Unlike jujuran, the woman's family will provide provisions in exchange for money for the agreement of the matchmaking or her fiancé. Although many researchers discuss dowry, no one has yet revealed the reality of giving jujuran as a sign of marriage. The method used in this study is an ethnographic-phenomenological approach to the marriage system in the Banjar community, Indonesia. The results of the research prove that the Banjar community tradition still uses jujuran or the giving of money from the male to the female family as a token which is nominally determined by the woman. The purpose of jujuran is to improve the economy of their children when they get married, although some consider it to determine who has the right to propose to their daughter. Sometimes these arranged marriages are traditionally accepted in Indonesia, based on family decisions, but sometimes overlook the fact that this is often a violation of their rights.
Keywords: women, matchmaking, jujuran, marriage, tradition
ABSTRAK

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengungkap apakah tradisi nikah di Indonesia dengan memberi uang seperti berjualan anak perempuan. Di Indonesia pada umumnya pemberian mas kawin / mehr saat akan menikah. Berbeda dengan jujuran, keluarga perempuan akan memberikan bekal dengan imbalan uang untuk kesepakatan perjodohan atau tunangannya. Meski banyak peneliti yang membahas mahar, namun belum ada yang mengungkap realitas pemberian jujuran sebagai tanda perkawinan. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah pendekatan etnografi-fenomenologi sistem perkawinan pada masyarakat Banjar, Indonesia. Hasil penelitian membuktikan bahwa tradisi masyarakat Banjar masih menggunakan jujuran atau pemberian uang dari laki-laki kepada keluarga perempuan sebagai tanda yang ditentukan secara nominal oleh perempuan. Tujuan jujuran adalah untuk meningkatkan ekonomi anak-anak mereka ketika mereka menikah, meskipun ada yang menganggapnya untuk menentukan siapa yang berhak melamar anak perempuan mereka. Kadang kawin perjodohan ini diterima secara tradisional di Indonesia, berdasarkan keputusan keluarga, tetapi terkadang mengabaikan fakta bahwa ini seringkali merupakan pelanggaran terhadap hak-hak mereka.
Kata Kunci: perempuan, perjodohan, jujuran, pernikahan, tradisi

INTRODUCTION

At this time, almost the whole world has begun to be interested in a marriage system that is traditionally regulated, such as in Africa, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and some other Muslim countries. According to [1] cause is a large number of migration practices so that this practice has spread today to countries of the western world. Many families choose their husbands and daughters based on wealth, thus turning the woman into a tradeable item.

[1] María del Mar Pastor Bravo, Pilar Almansa Martínez, and Ismael Jiménez Ruiz, "Arranged Marriages: Women for Sale," *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 6th International Conference on Intercultural Education "Education and Health: From a transcultural perspective", 132 (May 15, 2014): 564, doi:10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.04.354.

Of course, in practice, [2] the marriage system with this trading model has been conflicted by women, especially if the matchmaking practice is promised in exchange for a high dowry. The tendency of a woman's family is of course trying to find the best candidate for her child, especially when it comes to wealth. This pattern seems to have become a habit in the 20th century because it is considered promising for the future of their children [3]. Especially if the woman has a high education to a degree.

Menon [4] has researched in India, the findings prove that there is a relationship between a woman's income and wealth and domestic violence. One of the factors that have the potential to influence domestic violence is the dowry that a woman receives at marriage. Because gifts such as gold when getting married can endogenously affect the quality of a partner's match, the results showed a positive and significant effect of giving a very high dowry at marriage on domestic violence [5]. This pattern shows in general that women are abused by giving very large amounts to improve the family economy later. This is inversely proportional, his research states that this causes husbands to easily abuse their wives because they are considered poor or unable. This is among the causes of their domestic violence.

Based on their research [6] on women's choice when arranged marriage, the findings show that women who are to be married off are mostly voluntary between parents, even without the knowledge of their children. Second, the system of determining money as nominal in marriage is determined based on the amount of money to determine which marriage proposal will be accepted. Third, matchmaking with a marriage proposal seems to offer their child to marry only those who have large wealth and money in giving as a sign of marriage.

As is the case in the tradition of community marriage in Indonesia, which mostly follows Islam, the giving of dowry is an obligatory part that must be done by the husband to his wife [7]. However, the dowry is not burdensome because by the advice of the Qur'an Surah An-Nisa verse

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[2] Keera Allendorf and Dirgha J. Ghimire, "Determinants of Marital Quality in an Arranged Marriage Society," *Social Science Research* 42, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 59, doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2012.09.002.

[3] Amitrajeet A Batabyal, "On the Likelihood of Finding the Right Partner in an Arranged Marriage," *The Journal of Socio-Economics* 30, no. 3 (May 6, 2001): 273, doi:10.1016/S1053-5357(01)00095-6.

[4] Seetha Menon, "The Effect of Marital Endowments on Domestic Violence in India," *Journal of Development Economics* 143 (March 1, 2020): 143, doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.102389.

[5] Shyamal Chowdhury, Debdulal Mallick, and Prabal Roy Chowdhury, "Natural Shocks and Marriage Markets: Fluctuations in Mehr and Dowry in Muslim Marriages," *European Economic Review* 128 (September 1, 2020): 103510, doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103510.

[6] Amitrajeet A. Batabyal and Hamid Beladi, "A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Approach to Decision Making in Arranged Marriages," *Applied Mathematics Letters* 24, no. 12 (December 1, 2011): 2197–2200, doi:10.1016/j.aml.2011.06.025.

[7] Apriyanti Apriyanti, "Historiografi Mahar Dalam Pernikahan," *An Nisa'a* 12, no. 2 (2017): 163; Chowdhury, Mallick, and Roy Chowdhury, "Natural Shocks and Marriage Markets"; I. Pandang, Abdul Rahman, and Sitti Halimang, "Delayed Mahar: The Perspective of Islamic and Customary Law," *E&ES* 175, no. 1 (2018): 012140.

4, Meaning: Give dowry(mehr) to the woman (whom you marry) as a voluntary gift. Then if they give you a portion of the dowry with pleasure, eat (take) the gift (as food) which is delicious again with good results ".

The main purpose of this obligation to give dowry is to show the sincerity of the husband's intention to marry his wife and to place him in a noble degree. By obliging this dowry, Islam shows that women are creatures that deserve respect and have the right to own property. Likewise, the rules of the Hadith of the Prophet SAW,

انْظُرْ وَلَوْ خَاتَمًا مِنْ حَدِيْد

Meaning: "Look for even if it's only an iron ring." (Narrated by Bukhari and Muslim) The amount of the dowry is not determined by the Shari'a. Dowries may be of low value and may be of high value as long as they are mutually pleased. An-Nawawi explained,

في هذا الحديث أنه يجوز أن يكون الصداق, لأن خاتم الحديد في نهاية من القلة, وهذا مذهب الشافعي وهو مذهب جماهير العلماء من

means: "This hadith shows that the dowry was allowed a little (low value) and maybe a lot (high value) if both partners are happy with each other, because the iron ring shows a cheap dowry value. This is the opinion in the Shafi'i school and also the opinion of the scholars of *salaf* and *khalaf*. " (Syarh Sahih Muslim 9/190).

Kalwant Bhopal [8]when studying the phenomenon of dowry in Britain as a contribution to the patriarchal oppression of South Asian women in the household. The research on which this study is based examines the intersection of gender and ethnicity with special reference to South Asian women in the UK. The findings show that dowries were used to sell women as property in matchmaking. Education and religion made a significant difference in women's responses to dowries. Highly educated women can live together with their partners or be single and say dowries are degrading to women. Women with lower levels of education say the dowry is part of the traditions, customs, and identities of the South Asian people, these women are mated and given a dowry. When South Asian women became highly educated, they rejected matchmaking and the practice of dowry (private patriarchy) and entered the labor market (into public patriarchy).

Researchers differ from previous researchers by assuming that dowries are sometimes considered part of women's sales [9]. Even if you look at the traditions in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has an additional tradition that also uses nominal money [10] , namely the giving of *jujuran*. Unlike

[8] Kalwant Bhopal, "South Asian Women in East London: Motherhood and Social Support," in *Women's Studies International Forum*, vol. 21 (Elsevier, 1998), 485.
[9] Nadia G. Diamond-Smith et al., "Semi-Arranged Marriages and Dowry Ambivalence: Tensions in the Changing Landscape of Marriage Formation in South Asia," *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 22, no. 9 (2020): 971–986.
[10] Anwar Hafidzi, "Prasyarat Poligami Dalam Kitab Fiqih Islam Dan Kompilasi Hukum Islam Perspektif Maslahah Mursalah," *Al-Daulah: Jurnal Hukum Dan Perundangan Islam* 7, no. 2 (2017): 366–392.

the dowry, the determination of *jujuran* in the Banjar tradition in Indonesia is determined at the outset as part of the approval or rejection of the marriage plan (proposal) [11]. This is what makes this research interesting, that women are considered whether they are used as the merchandise that can be sold according to the rate set by their parents or women to be honored.

METHODS

The method used in this research is qualitative ethnography with a phenomenological approach by looking at the various activities and marriage systems in the Banjar tradition, Indonesia [12]. The sample used in this study was 20 women and 20 men aged between 19 to 25 years and living in Eastern Indonesia. This area was used as the research sample because the Banjar people tend to use traditional, religious, and state approaches in the implementation of their marriages. Information was collected using semi-structured interviews until the data was complete and written interviews were also carried out online because in the current conditions there is still a Covid-19 outbreak in Indonesia.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Jujuran: Giving or Buying Women?

In East Indonesia, especially in the Banjar community of South Kalimantan province, the practice of marriage is inseparable from the role of tradition that has been carried out from generation to generation [13]. This tradition makes it seem as if it is mandatory to carry out weddings between Banjar tribes or with other tribes [14]. Because it has become a custom, the practice of giving or determining a nominal value when proposing to his daughter is also an obligation.

Based on the data found, the concept of *Jujuran* is the giving of an amount of money that is given by the male family to the woman's family to be married [15]. What is interesting is, this gift is something that has been agreed upon by the two families who have bargained the *jujuran* price

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[11] Gusti Muzainah, "BAANTAR JUJURAN DALAM PERKAWINAN ADAT MASYARAKAT BANJAR," *Al-Insyiroh: Jurnal Studi Keislaman* 5, no. 2 (2019): 10.
[12] Theresia Anita Christiani, "Normative and Empirical Research Methods: Their Usefulness and Relevance in the Study of Law as an Object," *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences* 219 (2016): 201–207.
[13] Rifqi Akbari, "Jujuran Dalam Adat Banjar (Kajian Etnografis Hukum Islam Dalam Perkawinan Adat Banjar)" (B.S. thesis, Fakultas Syariah dan Hukum UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, n.d.).
[14] Mochamad Rochman Firdian, "TRADISI 'MAANTAR JUJURAN' DALAM PERKAWINAN ADAT BANJAR KALIMANTAN SELATAN PERSPEKTIF HUKUM ISLAM" (PhD Thesis, UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya, 2015).
[15] Omer Aijazi and Erin Baines, "Relationality, Culpability and Consent in Wartime: Men's Experiences of Forced Marriage," *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 11, no. 3 (2017): 463.

for the woman who will marry later[16]. Although at first it was assumed to be for consumption purposes for weddings or household furniture later. This tradition is indeed interesting to study because in practice parents use their daughters to accept or reject other people's proposals [17]. If it is considered too cheap or unsuitable, the woman's family can look for someone else who wants her daughter. The amount of *jujuran* value also depends on several things. Like the bride's background, the appearance of a woman, or indeed a pure agreement between the two brides[18].

Jujuran is different from dowry, where dowry is mentioned in the consent *qabul* while *jujuran* itself is not mentioned. *Jujuran* is not entirely the property of the bride because *jujuran* money is used to finance the wedding party and can also be used by the bride's parents to buy the woman's needs and as initial capital for a family[19]. Until now, this obligation to give has drawn the pros and cons of this system. Is this system like buying women or just giving, ultimately became the cause of divorce.[20].

The effect is of course sometimes burdensome for men if the money requested is very large, even though from the Islamic side, this tradition is not recommended. It could even be considered as a subtle refusal so that the men would not be offended by the high demand for money. This effect is stated by some opinions only to ensure the seriousness of the prospective groom to his daughter who is getting married so that it is economically secure for some time.

Dowry is not buying women, but respect

Matchmaking for money causes an understanding that the family arranges the marriage of their daughter and is trafficked for the reason of improving the economic situation of the family [21]. Based on the data obtained, *jujuran* and dowry are part of the tradition and Islamic religious affairs. The dowry that is asked for is mostly not too high. While *jujuran* is enforced to ask for the eligibility of the prospective husband to increase the economic level of a woman's family.

Based on research results, 85% of women who are ready to get married agree with *jujuran* as part of determining a marriage match. 10% disagreed with the assumption that *adjudication* was

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[16] Zobaida Akhter, "Girls Not Brides: Concern of Distance Learning: Strategies to Prevent Child Marriage and Curse of Dowry: Bangladesh Perspective," 2019.

[17] Mulki Al-Sharmani, "Marriage in Islamic Interpretive Tradition: Revisiting the Legal and the Ethical," *Journal of Islamic Ethics* 2, no. 1–2 (2018): 76.

[18] Nasaiy Aziz, "The Great Phenomenon of Online Sirri Marriage for Male and Female," *Budapest International Research and Critics Institute (BIRCI-Journal): Humanities and Social Sciences* 1, no. 3 (2018): 445–450.

[19] Aksar Aksar and Triwahyuni Lestari, "PRAKTEK PERKAWINAN ADAT JUJURAN DI KABUPATEN ROKAN HULU RIAU DITINJAU DARI UNDANG-UNDANG NO. 1 TAHUN 1974," *JOURNAL EQUITABLE* 4, no. 2 (2019): 37–58.

[20] Nataša Rijavec KlobuČar and Barbara SimoniČ, "Causes of Divorce from the Perspective of Females in Slovenia," *Journal of Divorce & Remarriage* 58, no. 4 (May 19, 2017): 263–75, doi:10.1080/10502556.2017.1300024.

[21] Nicolas G. Vaillant and Valérie Harrant, "Determinants of the Likelihood of Finding the Right Partner in an Arranged Marriage: Evidence from a French Matchmaking Agency," *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, Special Issue on the Household Economy, 37, no. 2 (April 1, 2008): 657, doi:10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.055.

like buying a woman and was considered burdensome to the prospective husband if it was too high. On the other hand, men also thought that 70% agreed to give money to a woman's family as a basis for agreeing to propose to her child later. 20% of men do not agree with *jujuran* because it is considered burdensome and as if it is bargaining for girls.

Nearly 90% of women are also against forced marriage on the assumption that it is for the good of the girl and agree on her choice and her family. Meanwhile, 60% of men agreed to the marriage based on their parents' choice and were forced to marry their choice. While 20% do not agree if the marriage is only approved by the parents of the woman, there is a mutual agreement between the family and the prospective bride.

When the bride and groom are still women or virgins, of course, researchers strongly oppose the forced marriage. The women interviewed opposed this marriage for reasons of religion, love, and women's rights. In contrast to men, there are still some opinions that still agree, because the right to marry a woman lies with her parents or father.

According to researchers, giving money for the sake of carrying out this tradition is considered capable of influencing women's welfare and the distribution of wealth in their families. Although sometimes they are still considered selling their daughters. However, the prevalence and amount of *jujuran* payments vary from region to region, depending on economic conditions, community structure, institutions, and family characteristics. Payments to propose to girls have also developed in Banjar society and over time. However, there is a shift if it occurs in women who are already widows (married and then divorced). It all depends on the mindset and understanding of the Banjar community and others in understanding the meaning of *jujuran* or giving money based on the request of the woman's family.

However, the researchers saw that women were more sensitive to the problem of matchmaking based on nominal money which, if high, was received, if slightly rejected. Most of the women also expressed disagreement with the practice of pre-marriage bargaining because it was considered to violate rights and sometimes endangered disharmony in the household.

CONCLUSION

Dowry and *jujuran* are gifts given by the male family to female candidates and this has changed according to the times. Mahar is a part that must be carried out during the marriage contract, while *jujuran* is given to pre-marriage as a sign of acceptance and acceptance from the woman's family. The nominal value of *jujuran* depends on the condition of the bride, the higher the education and beauty, the higher the value of *jujuran* money based on the understanding of the

traditions in the Banjar community. The purpose of determining *jujuran* is to emphasize the seriousness of a man when proposing to his daughter, not to be sold or made into a transaction.

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REVIEW FORM ARTICLE JURNAL SY-SYIR'AH

TITLE	
ABSTRACT	
INTRODUCTION	
CONTENTS	
CONCLUSION	
REFERENCES	
NOTES	
I DECIDED THIS ARTICLE:	(A) ACCEPT SUBMISSION / (B) REVISIONS REQUIRED / (C) RESUBMIT FOR REVIEW / (D) DECLINE SUBMISSION

Yogyakarta, ..., ..., 2020